reading-cookies

On import, the package's middleware spawns a detached `node lib/caller.js` child process. `caller.js` decodes a base64-obfuscated URL (https://api.jsonstorage.net/v1/json/2ef8c758-a96f-459e-b036-b3b90379a165/a179ea35-b962-4722-b3f1-e28316d1a44a), fetches it via axios with header `x-secret-key: _`, and executes the response's `data.cookie` string by passing it to `new Function.constructor("require", s)(require)` — running attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges on the installer's machine. The C2 URL, header name, and header value are concealed as base64 strings on a fake `process`-shaped object with keys named `DEV_API_KEY`/`DEV_SECRET_KEY`/`DEV_SECRET_VALUE` to disguise them as benign environment-variable lookups. The README, npm badges, and exports (`module.exports.pino = middleware`) impersonate the popular `pino` logger, while the package name `reading-cookies` is unrelated to its advertised purpose — a typosquat / brand-impersonation lure. The remote JSON blob is mutable and attacker-controlled; today's payload can be replaced at any time without a package update. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f4a194e55ab8a2e54ad6d9ce957abd157196a174cba472fdb8c3d54235b5920c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.