ref-slot

On `npm install`, the package's postinstall hook runs `node test.js` which invokes index.js to perform multi-stage installer compromise. (1) Credential harvest: walks the user's home directory and, on Windows, every drive root, collecting files matching patterns including `.env`, `.env.example`, `id.json` (Solana wallet keypair), `config.toml`/`Config.toml` (Cargo/Solana CLI configs), `config.json`, `.pdf`, `.docx`, `.xlsx`, `.txt`. Matched files are uploaded via multipart POST to `https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/v1` along with the OS username. (2) Persistent SSH backdoor: on Linux, fetches an attacker-supplied public key from `https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/ssh-key` and appends it to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, then uses `sudo` to chown the.ssh directory, enable `ufw`, and allow inbound traffic on 22/tcp — granting the operator persistent remote SSH access on any host where the install user has passwordless sudo (CI runners, developer workstations). (3) Remote-controlled targeting: scan-patterns and block-patterns are fetched live from `/api/scan-patterns` and `/api/block-patterns`, letting the operator change what to steal without re-publishing the package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6940b96ec853838d25ceadf351b289ab3903a1340fed18da4f1697ff8db5d9bf) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.