respecpow@0.9.3
Spec-Powered AI Development Framework - 融合 OpenSpec 规范驱动 + Superpowers 执行引擎的企业级 AI 辅助编程框架（安装即生效版）
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has an automatic postinstall that mutates global AI-agent control settings without consent, meeting the blocking policy for install-time control-surface mutation. Project-scoped init and update behavior does not mitigate that install-time action.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
npm installation of the package.
Impact
Future agent sessions and tool actions invoke respecpow commands automatically.
Mechanism
The postinstall script reads existing global settings, adds session, prompt, and tool-use hooks, then writes the settings back.
Policy narrative
During npm installation, the lifecycle hook checks for global CodeBuddy and Claude Code settings and automatically registers recurring respecpow commands. It then writes the modified settings without asking the user. The added hooks run on future agent sessions, prompts, and tool use.
AI rationale
The package has an automatic postinstall that mutates global AI-agent control settings without consent, meeting the blocking policy for install-time control-surface mutation. Project-scoped init and update behavior does not mitigate that install-time action.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/postinstall.js~/.codebuddy/settings.json~/.claude/settings.json
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 97.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- package.json runs scripts/postinstall.js automatically during installation.
- The postinstall hook registers without prompting in detected CodeBuddy and Claude Code global settings directories.
- It adds recurring session, prompt, and tool-use commands to those agent hooks and writes the modified settings file.
- The postinstall entrypoint calls both registration functions; no consent check appears in that flow.
Evidence against
- The separate init and update commands inspect or configure project-level agent files when invoked.
- CodeGraph integration is reached through init and installs a local project integration.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemShell
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js || echo 'Postinstall skipped'
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js || echo 'Postinstall skipped'
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgdist/core/init/codegraph-step.jsView file
11*/
L12: import { execSync } from 'child_process';
L13: // ============================================================
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/core/init/codegraph-step.jsView on unpkg · L11Findings
1 Critical6 High3 Medium5 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/postinstall.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processdist/core/init/codegraph-step.js
HighShell
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/core/init/engine.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/core/init/codegraph-step.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/core/init/engine.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to respecpow@0.9.3.
See all versions of respecpow for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing respecpow@0.9.3. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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