rollup-plugin-polyfill-hold

The package presents itself as a rollup plugin / CDN icon-asset fetcher but its exported getPlugin, setPlugin, and getPluginExten functions issue HTTPS requests to a hardcoded endpoint at rest-icon-handler.store/icons/103 and /icons/389 and pass the JSON-parsed response body to eval(), giving the endpoint owner arbitrary JavaScript execution in the caller's Node process. The destination URL is assembled from split constants (protocol/separator/subdomain/domain/path) rather than appearing as a single string, while a decoy setDefaultModule references legitimate CDN providers (cloudflare/fastly/akamai) that are never contacted by the eval path. getPlugin additionally schedules getPluginExten via setTimeout so the fetch-and-eval recurs. The eval-of-remote-content behavior is not disclosed by the package's advertised purpose and the endpoint is unrelated to any documented CDN. ## Source: ghsa-malware (55b9bd8da2181c7be27563d32bcd51eeda41395e0a1660c736840cc94e3613b1) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.