shop-minis

On `npm install`, the package's postinstall script (`postinstall.js`, run via `scripts.postinstall = 'node postinstall.js'`) collects host identity — `whoami`, `id`, `os.hostname()`, `os.platform()`, current working directory, and the env vars `CI`, `GITHUB_REPOSITORY`, `NODE_ENV` — and sends them to the hardcoded attacker-controlled host `svr57aylqme3zald4p0psi1hw827q1eq.oastify.com` (a Burp Collaborator / OAST canary domain) via both `https.get` and DNS lookup. The package name `shop-minis` and self-described 'Security research canary — shopify' impersonate Shopify's Shop Minis platform, so any developer expecting that namespace would unwittingly leak host recon to the canary operator's collaborator instance. The package ships no real functionality matching its name; the only effect of installation is the exfiltration beacon. ## Source: ghsa-malware (15ec57895cae37229f449175b247b9d216d8b9e6f7d521341cfa6ffee413b07e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.