stake-math

On `npm install`, the package's postinstall hook (`scripts/install-check.cjs`, wired via package.json `scripts.postinstall`) fetches a JSON config from a hardcoded non-publisher host (`https://www.log-prettier.store/config/stake-peer-sync.json`), reads a tgz URL from that config, downloads the tarball, extracts it, runs a nested `npm install` inside the extracted directory, and then `require()`s `peer-math.js` from the dropped tree, executing it in the installer's Node process. There is no version pin, hash, or signature check, and the control-plane host is mutable and unrelated to the package's advertised purpose (a small Kelly-stake math helper) or to any legitimate publisher. The package also exhibits identity divergence: `package.json` `name` is `stake-math` while the README presents it as `polymarket-stake-math`, and `homepage` points at the same unrelated `log-prettier.store` domain — consistent with brand impersonation used to lure installers into running the dropper. Installing this version results in arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution on the installer machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0c0588616ff1e3cda86498497275add22443058899d0b9866cf3579e9f679c4f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.