tailwind-anim

index.js appends an eval(atob(...)) blob to an otherwise legitimate Tailwind plugin. On require(), the decoded loader queries Ethereum JSON-RPC block explorers for transactions from hardcoded address 0xa322e5f3d311d3080e6f01210463e9adc2490ef1a, decodes an IP address from the transaction's `to` field, fetches an XOR-encrypted JavaScript payload from http://<resolved-ip>:443/0x/cls and http://<resolved-ip>:443/0x/ls (payload delivered via an x-payload-b64 header, XOR-decoded with a User-Agent-derived key), and executes the result via eval and a detached, windowHidden `spawn('node', ['-e',...], {detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true}).unref()` child process. Sensitive identifiers (http, https, child_process, spawn, URLs) are stored as \uXXXX-escaped strings inside a base64 wrapper. The on-chain lookup lets the operator rotate C2 endpoints by broadcasting new transactions from the attacker-controlled address, giving arbitrary remote code execution on any machine that installs or requires this package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (204592221540d7404642fb39488b1b235cf9f21b372558c196b404b48f3d7c23) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.