tailwindcss-effector

src/index.js appends a heavily obfuscated async IIFE after a legitimate-looking TailwindCSS plugin. On import, the IIFE issues HTTPS requests to remote JSON-RPC endpoints (TRON-style transaction queries reading `.data[0].raw_data.data`, and Ethereum-style `eth_call` reading `result.input.substring(2)`), XOR-decrypts the returned hex bytes, and executes them: the primary path calls `eval(e)` on the decoded payload, and a secondary path spawns a detached child process via `child_process.spawn(..., {detached:true, stdio:..., windowsHide:true})` whose output is also `eval`'d in an error handler. All sensitive strings (URLs, RPC method names, host names, module/method names, argv) are hidden behind a custom string-shuffle decoder `_$_d407=(function(b,m){...})("<blob>",3168449)`, indexed as `_$_d407[N]`. The package name pattern (effector vs. tailwindcss-animated / tailwindcss-animate) plus malicious code grafted onto a working plugin is consistent with typosquat-with-payload. Anyone who installs and imports this package executes attacker-controlled JavaScript decoded from on-chain RPC responses and gains a persistent detached child process — full RCE on the installer's machine, with the C2 channel hidden inside legitimate-looking blockchain RPC traffic. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a9b2fb035f29322cf7b8a60bbb94a5c171af51f18b364ad807c7166d7497367e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.