toga-ai@1.0.1077
TOGA Technology Team Claude Knowledge System — shared AI coding harness with skills, knowledge base CLI, and project installer for Claude Code.
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package’s automatic postinstall modifies global Claude Code settings to enable private content telemetry to a fixed collector without affirmative consent. This is an unconsented lifecycle mutation of an AI-agent control surface, so the package should be blocked.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Installing the package through npm, which runs its postinstall hook.
Impact
Claude Code may send private conversation and tool content, along with account and session identifiers, to the configured collector.
Mechanism
The installer writes a telemetry configuration with content logging enabled and a fixed endpoint and authorization header to the user-level Claude settings file.
Policy narrative
During npm postinstall, the installer enables Claude Code telemetry in the user-level settings, including prompt, assistant response, and tool detail logging. It configures a fixed collector and authorization header, and enables account and session identifiers. The setting applies even to a global installation; the available opt-out does not require affirmative consent before the lifecycle hook writes the configuration.
AI rationale
The package’s automatic postinstall modifies global Claude Code settings to enable private content telemetry to a fixed collector without affirmative consent. This is an unconsented lifecycle mutation of an AI-agent control surface, so the package should be blocked.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/install.js.claude/settings.json
Network endpoints1
otel.togaiq.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 99.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- package.json runs scripts/install.js automatically during postinstall.
- scripts/install.js configures Claude Code telemetry to send prompt, response, and tool data to otel.togaiq.com, with account and session identifiers enabled.
- The installer writes these settings to the user-level Claude configuration and invokes the telemetry setup on every install; its opt-out is not an affirmative consent guard.
- The other inspected integration locations describe session files under the user’s Claude directory; those excerpts do not establish a separate attack.
- The install hook applies the telemetry setup even when a global install does not enter a project directory.
Evidence against
- The installer provides a TOGA_SKIP_TELEMETRY=1 opt-out, but telemetry is enabled by default and the lifecycle hook does not require affirmative consent.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemShell
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
18 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js --post-install
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js --post-install
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgscripts/install.jsView file
11* 3. If git available: use git repo as source (newer); otherwise use npm bundle silently
L12: * 4. Install from chosen source into project .claude/
L13: *
...
L35: // Team skills that were retired from the bundle. Install MOVES them out of a dev's
L36: // .claude/skills/ (to .claude/sk[redacted]/<name>-<yyyymmdd>) so they stop loading but
L37: // nothing is lost. Only moved when the bundle no longer ships them.
...
L100: try {
L101: fs.writeFileSync(CACHE_FILE, repoDir + '\n');
L102: } catch (e) { /* non-fatal */ }
...
L114: try {
L115: fs.mkdirSync(defaultDir, { recursive: true });
L116:
Findings
1 Critical15 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/install.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighExternal Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationscripts/install.js
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationscripts/install.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedskills/start/scripts/ticket-parse.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityknowledge.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/hooks/start-gate.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityskills/commit/scripts/commit-helper.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityskills/start/scripts/start-helper.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/harness.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to toga-ai@1.0.1077.
See all versions of toga-ai for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing toga-ai@1.0.1077. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.