registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / @techierathore/techieflow
@techierathore/techieflow
TechieFlow: a spec-driven development framework for AI coding agents, for Claude Code and OpenCode. One command installs it into any project.
This report shows the evidence for @techierathore/techieflow@1.2.0. 5 of 7 known versions are blocked or flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe reachable npm postinstall path creates a consumer project's Claude Code permission configuration without separate consent, enabling edit acceptance and broad tool access. This is an unconsented install-time mutation of an AI-agent control surface.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
An npm install or ci runs the package postinstall hook when installed as a dependency.
Impact
The consumer project receives a broader Claude Code permission policy without a separate consent prompt for that change.
Mechanism
The hook invokes the project installer, which creates .claude/settings.json if absent with edit acceptance enabled by default and Bash and other tools allowed without approval.
Policy narrative
On dependency installation, the postinstall hook invokes the installer against the consumer project. If the project has no Claude settings file, the installer creates one that accepts edits by default and allows Bash and other tools without approval. The source preserves an existing settings file, but the automatic creation still changes the consumer project's agent permissions without a separate consent prompt.
AI rationale
The reachable npm postinstall path creates a consumer project's Claude Code permission configuration without separate consent, enabling edit acceptance and broad tool access. This is an unconsented install-time mutation of an AI-agent control surface.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/npm-postinstall.mjsscripts/install.mjs.claude/settings.json
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 97.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- package.json runs a postinstall hook.
- scripts/npm-postinstall.mjs runs the installer in the consumer project after an npm dependency install.
- The installer creates .claude/settings.json when it is missing and preserves an existing file.
- The new settings accept edits by default and allow Bash and other Claude Code tools, with no tools requiring approval.
Evidence against
- The permission file is project-scoped and is only created when no settings file already exists.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystem
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/npm[redacted]
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgscripts/install.mjsView file
•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation.
file of shippedfiles(".opencode/command", ".md")) if (!librarypersonas.has(file)) plan(`.opencode/command/${file}`);
for (const path of [".codex", ".agents/skills"]) if (existssync(join(target, path))) plan(path, "(retired codex adapter)");
for (const lib of [".trblazeui", ".techierag"]) {
if (!existssync(join(target, lib))) continue;
const rest = readdirsync(join(target, lib)).filter((f) => f !== ".codex-agent-package-owned" && f !== ".gitignore");
plan(`${lib}/.codex-agent-package-owned`);
if (rest.length === 0) plan(`${lib}/.gitignore`);
}
if (existssync(join(target,
High
Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation
Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.
scripts/install.mjsView on unpkgFindings
5 High3 Medium5 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationscripts/install.mjs
HighPayload In Excluded Dir.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.sh
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedscripts/install.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/npm-postinstall.mjs
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helper.tfcore/utils/tf-goal.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @techierathore/techieflow@1.2.0.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @techierathore/techieflow@1.2.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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Versions
7 known versions1.2.0latestshownMaliciousSoft block: AI-agent control surfaceBlockPublishedOct 18, 2026, 12:00 PM1.1.1SuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedOct 16, 2026, 12:21 PM1.1.0MaliciousSoft block: AI-agent control surfaceBlockPublishedOct 1, 2026, 3:07 PM1.0.4MaliciousSoft block: AI-agent control surfaceBlock