toga-ai@1.0.972
TOGA Technology Team Claude Knowledge System — shared AI coding harness with skills, knowledge base CLI, and project installer for Claude Code.
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall modifies global Claude Code settings to enable content telemetry and direct it to a package-configured endpoint, without requiring affirmative consent. This is an unconsented mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Installing the package through npm, which runs its postinstall hook.
Impact
Claude Code may transmit prompts, assistant responses, and tool details to the configured telemetry service.
Mechanism
The installer writes telemetry environment variables into `~/.claude/settings.json`, enabling telemetry and prompt, assistant-response, and tool-detail logging, and setting the OTLP endpoint and authorization header.
Policy narrative
Installing `toga-ai` automatically runs its postinstall hook. That hook enables Claude Code telemetry and content logging, then configures an OTLP endpoint and authorization header in the user’s global settings. This changes a foreign agent’s global control surface without affirmative consent; an environment variable can opt out, but the default is to apply the settings.
AI rationale
The automatic postinstall modifies global Claude Code settings to enable content telemetry and direct it to a package-configured endpoint, without requiring affirmative consent. This is an unconsented mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/install.js~/.claude/settings.json
Network endpoints1
otel.togaiq.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 97.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- `package.json` runs `scripts/install.js --post-install` automatically on install.
- The postinstall writes managed telemetry settings into the user’s global Claude settings file before exiting.
- Those settings enable prompt, assistant-response, and tool-detail logging to `https://otel.togaiq.com` with a package-defined authorization header.
- The write is skipped only when `TOGA_SKIP_TELEMETRY=1` is already set; no consent prompt is required.
- The inspected kickoff hook writes a project-local gate lock, and the memory hook warns about build rules in Claude memory; neither explains or limits the global telemetry write.
Evidence against
- The installer preserves unrelated settings and backs up an existing settings file before replacing it.
- The telemetry write has an opt-out environment variable, but it does not require affirmative consent.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
18 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js --post-install
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js --post-install
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgscripts/install.jsView file
11* 3. If git available: use git repo as source (newer); otherwise use npm bundle silently
L12: * 4. Install from chosen source into project .claude/
L13: *
...
L111: try {
L112: fs.writeFileSync(CACHE_FILE, repoDir + '\n');
L113: } catch (e) { /* non-fatal */ }
...
L125: try {
L126: fs.mkdirSync(defaultDir, { recursive: true });
L127:
...
L167: try {
L168: fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(defaultDir), { recursive: true });
L169: const result = spawnSync('git', ['clone', REPO_URL, defaultDir], {
Critical
Findings
1 Critical15 High5 Medium5 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/install.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighExternal Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationscripts/install.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedscripts/hooks/kickoff-gate.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityknowledge.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityskills/commit/scripts/commit-helper.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/harness.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/hooks/post-edit-validate.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/hooks/session-start.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/install.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to toga-ai@1.0.972.
See all versions of toga-ai for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing toga-ai@1.0.972. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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