ux-atlas@0.1.6
UX skills for agents. Each skill is skills/<name>/SKILL.md.
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe active postinstall hook writes package-controlled behavior into foreign agent instruction files without an affirmative consent gate. This is an unconsented install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs scripts/init.mjs from postinstall.
- The local postinstall path resolves the consumer project root and calls applyPointers without an affirmative consent check.
- applyPointers edits root AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md, removing a legacy instruction and adding package instructions.
- The upsert routine writes the resulting content to those files.
- The injected AGENTS.md instructions direct how the agent routes requests and loads skills.
- The installer skips global installs.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgpackage.json runs scripts/init.mjs from postinstall.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L24Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
scripts/scan.mjsView on unpkg · L105Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to ux-atlas@0.1.6.
See all versions of ux-atlas for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing ux-atlas@0.1.6. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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