verify-mycommand

On `npm install`, postinstall.js executes `whoami` and `id`, collects host identity (hostname, platform, cwd) and CI metadata (CI, GITHUB_REPOSITORY, NODE_ENV environment variables), and beacons the data via HTTPS GET to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain `md3zp4gf8gwxh437mjijacjbe2ky8pwe.oastify.com`. A DNS lookup of `<whoami>.<host>` is also performed for out-of-band exfiltration. The package's own metadata describes it as a 'Security research canary' with a 'Takeover By lobo' marker, consistent with a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept or namespace hijack — but the install-time behavior is real exfiltration of installer identity and CI context to an attacker-controlled OAST endpoint regardless of stated intent. Any machine running `npm install` for this package leaks host and CI identifiers to a third party. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f26fdadf3b7e97f88e15aa331f3af159ef2a7d3e29e5df68fe2aba59cf4b8e20) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (0314ac9dcfab8957567efe770124ce8f1fd490d7d461d0853630bbe5806a43e0) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'verify-mycommand' @ 2.0.4 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.