vite-plugin-logo

On require, index.js walks up to 5 parent directories searching for `public/assets/logo.png`, scans the file bytes for the marker `__VITE_ASSET_CACHE_v1__`, base64-decodes the bytes that follow the marker, and executes them via `new Function('require', code)(require)` — passing the real `require` so the decoded payload has full Node capabilities (filesystem, network, child_process). The entire loader is wrapped in `try {... } catch (e) {}` to silently swallow errors, and uses single-letter identifiers and a marker name that masquerades as a Vite-internal cache to disguise intent. This is a steganographic loader: any project that installs and imports this plugin will execute whatever code is embedded in a PNG bearing the magic marker, giving an attacker (the package author, or anyone who can ship such a PNG into a consumer's `public/assets/` tree) a generic remote-code-execution primitive at build/import time. The package name follows the `vite-plugin-*` convention but is published under the generic placeholder author `Vite Community` with no repository or homepage, consistent with namespace abuse against the Vite plugin ecosystem. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3d700702000b48b3238610a7b5eb5380c9385148d2638f4e6a0f58174a70515e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.