vortnode

On `npm install`, the `preinstall` hook (`node lib/setup.js`) runs on Windows and invokes `lib/worker.js`, which downloads an executable to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp (or %TEMP%) under Microsoft-update cover names (`msedge_update`, `chrome_installer`, `dotnet_host`, `onedrive_setup`, `teams_update`) and silently executes it via `spawn(fp, [], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true })` followed by `ch.unref()`. The download URL is XOR-decoded at runtime from opaque buffers carried in the `foldmap` dependency, with a fallback chain of https → `curl.exe` → `bitsadmin` to maximize delivery; TLS verification is disabled (`rejectUnauthorized: false`); the Mark-of-the-Web `:Zone.Identifier` ADS is stripped before execution. All sensitive identifiers in `lib/worker.js` (`https`, `child_process`, `spawn`, `curl.exe`, `bitsadmin`, `powershell.exe`, `:Zone.Identifier`, env vars, cover filenames) are constructed with `String.fromCharCode(...)` to evade signature scanning. The package's advertised `index.js` API (`spawn`/`kill`/`list`/`has`) is a decoy never referenced by the install path. Any developer or CI runner installing `vortnode` on Windows executes attacker-controlled code as the current user. ## Source: ghsa-malware (760133192732842730eac928cc1132f28d87b8dd77e5f442d1e3b19bc993e114) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.