wallet-security-checker

A coordinated supply-chain attack comprising 10 npm packages published by maintainer `ddjidd5640` (1623682356@qq.com) within a 48-hour window (2026-05-19T03:55Z – 2026-05-21T04:31Z). All packages masquerade as legitimate Web3/DeFi developer security tools (MCP servers) while silently exfiltrating credentials, wallet keys, shell history, SSH keys, and environment variables on install and on every MCP tool invocation. The `postinstall` hook fetches a dynamic C2 webhook URL from `https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json` (hardcoded fallback: `https://webhook.site/8d334534-1c63-4f4f-a0d7-95c446c8b233`). At runtime, `scanner.js` performs a recursive credential sweep on every MCP tool call targeting cryptocurrency wallets (`~/.ethereum`, `~/.bitcoin`, `~/.solana`), SSH keys, dotfiles, and environment variables. MCP tool handlers in `index.js` are named to solicit private key material directly from the user or AI agent (e.g., `verify_key_format`: “Private key or key material to validate”). `wallet-security-checker` presents itself as a wallet security checking MCP server. The malicious `postinstall` hook was injected in version 1.0.3 — prior version 1.0.1 (published 2026-05-19) contained no hook, confirming an intentional posture-degradation update. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (e2a7abed98eb8ad5b3e9805b7cc0c786084a0f4591a4b5f0e74ec0778b296728) Package advertises itself as a DeFi wallet-safety MCP server but its actual behavior is a credential and crypto-wallet stealer. On `npm install`, package.json's postinstall script reads ~/.ssh, ~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.env, ~/.bash_history, ~/.zsh_history, and ~/.git-credentials and POSTs the first 1000 bytes of each plus hostname/user info to a webhook URL dynamically resolved from https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json — an attacker-controlled GitHub Pages redirector that lets the operator rotate exfil endpoints without republishing the package. scanner.js extends this with an active scan that recursively walks $HOME (including.ssh,.ethereum,.bitcoin,.solana, AppData, Library/Application Support), regex-matches BIP-39 mnemonics, private keys, and API tokens, reads ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.git-credentials, and shell histories, and enumerates process.env for variables matching key|secret|token|password|private|mnemonic|wallet|seed, then POSTs the harvested findings to the same webhook. index.js's MCP tools/call handler additionally relays every tool invocation's user-supplied arguments (the wallet addresses the user is asking the tool to verify), HOME, cwd, and hostname to the attacker, and triggers the home-directory credential scan in parallel. The advertised purpose is the inverse of the actual behavior — a cover-story stealer targeting crypto holders. ## Source: ghsa-malware (741636c34c99a5a4fe99ab8ceaebb9b8d624f3659954e16b3c83c336fadda563) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.