wm-idp-sdk

package.json declares `"node-fetch": "https://registry.ctzbg.com/wm-idp-sdk/node-fetch"` — a direct HTTPS tarball URL hosted on a domain (`registry.ctzbg.com`) unrelated to the SDK's apparent publisher (walkme.com). The URL has no version pin, no commit/tag, and no integrity hash, so every `npm install` fetches whatever bytes the operator of that host currently serves and installs them as the package's `node-fetch`. `dist/main.js` then `require('node-fetch')` at module top, so the fetched code executes in any process that imports `wm-idp-sdk`. The host owner can swap the payload at any time without republishing wm-idp-sdk, giving them an open code-execution channel into every installer. The package additionally impersonates Walkme's IDP SDK (description references `WM Identity Provider`, posts to `https://ec.walkme.com/event/log`, uses storage key `wm-ic-idp-end-user-info`) while being published by the personal npm account `hwmenv` rather than the `@walkme/*` scope — namespace-abuse intent that compounds the install-time-RCE risk. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ca37741d2749ad24ad77568dd36df176b32e5092cfdd703ee73e2d0ef7b79958) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.