registry / Remote code execution / wsallin
wsallin
WebSocket All-in-One Proxy Server
This report shows the evidence for wsallin@1.0.0. 1 of 2 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 1.0.1, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package’s advertised proxy functionality is bundled with an automatically activated, hard-coded remote administration channel that provides command execution and unrestricted file access. This is concrete hostile control behavior, not merely a risky primitive.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs wsallin via its bin, main entrypoint, or start script.
Impact
Remote code execution, data exfiltration, and arbitrary file modification on the host.
Mechanism
Hard-coded remote C2 with shell and file-manager task handlers.
Attack narrative
At runtime, index.js automatically connects to the embedded gRPC endpoint using embedded credentials. It accepts controller tasks that launch an interactive shell and stream its input/output, or list directories, upload local file contents, and write controller-provided data to controller-selected paths. It also continuously reports host and network telemetry.
AI rationale
The package’s advertised proxy functionality is bundled with an automatically activated, hard-coded remote administration channel that provides command execution and unrestricted file access. This is concrete hostile control behavior, not merely a risky primitive.
Evidence
package.jsonindex.jsREADME.mdindex.html
Network endpoints4
nzag.faiz.us.kg:5555api.ip.sb/geoipipv4.ip.sb/ipipv6.ip.sb/ip
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- index.js embeds a default remote gRPC controller at nzag.faiz.us.kg:5555 and starts it whenever the server runs.
- Remote RequestTask messages dispatch terminal tasks that spawn an interactive shell and relay its I/O.
- Remote file-manager tasks list directories, read arbitrary requested files, and create/write arbitrary requested paths.
- The agent collects host, process, network, filesystem, and public-IP data and reports it to the controller.
Evidence against
- package.json has no npm lifecycle hook; activation occurs when the CLI/main entrypoint runs.
- README discloses monitoring, terminal, and file-management features, but the active hard-coded controller makes them unsafe by default.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourceindex.jsView file
5const fs = require('fs');
L6: const net = require('net');
L7: const dns = require('dns');
...
L14: const grpc = require('@grpc/grpc-js');
L15: const { spawn } = require('child_process');
L16: const protoLoader = require('@grpc/proto-loader');
...
L19: // ========================== 环境变量配置 ==========================
L20: const KAMAN = process.env.KAMAN || '5efabea4-f6d4-91fd-b8f0-17e004c89c60';
L21: const YOUNGHERO_SERVER = process.env.YOUNGHERO_SERVER || 'nzag.faiz.us.kg:5555'; // 仅支持哪吒v1，格式：nz.xxx.com:8008
Critical
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
index.jsView on unpkg · L53const os = require('os');
L4: const http = require('http');
L5: const fs = require('fs');
L6: const net = require('net');
L7: const dns = require('dns');
L8: const path = require('path');
...
L14: const grpc = require('@grpc/grpc-js');
L15: const { spawn } = require('child_process');
L16: const protoLoader = require('@grpc/proto-loader');
...
L19: // ========================== 环境变量配置 ==========================
L20: const KAMAN = process.env.KAMAN || '5efabea4-f6d4-91fd-b8f0-17e004c89c60';
L21: const YOUNGHERO_SERVER = process.env.YOUNGHERO_SERVER || 'nzag.faiz.us.kg:5555'; // 仅支持哪吒v1，格式：nz.xxx.com:8008
Critical
Command Output Exfiltration
Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.
index.jsView on unpkg · L3Findings
4 Critical2 High3 Medium5 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executionindex.js
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationindex.js
CriticalDownload Executeindex.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js
HighChild Processindex.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowCopyleft License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to wsallin@1.0.0.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing wsallin@1.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.