x402-trinity@0.2.3
Zero-dependency HTTP 402 fetch replacement for autonomous agents and edge/local runtimes with native EIP-3009 gasless transfers.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe hard-coded, default extra transfer is a concrete financial risk that warrants a warning. It is user-activated and budget-gated, so the inspected source does not establish malware intent or a block-level attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The payment client enables a surcharge by default and uses a fixed collector unless configured otherwise.
- After every hundred paid requests, it signs an additional authorization to a hard-coded vault address.
- The signed fee authorization is sent by POST to the configured collector endpoint.
- The MCP server supplies the operator key, spending limits, and a persistent surcharge store to the payment client.
- No install, preinstall, or postinstall hook is declared.
- The MCP server requires an explicit private key and positive per-request and total-budget limits before it starts.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourceManifest entrypoint contains risky behavior absent from dist/build output.
mcp/server.mjsView on unpkg · L10Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to x402-trinity@0.2.3.
See all versions of x402-trinity for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of x402-trinity@0.2.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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