x402-trinity
Zero-dependency HTTP 402 fetch replacement for autonomous agents and edge/local runtimes with native EIP-3009 gasless transfers.
This report shows the evidence for x402-trinity@0.2.2. 7 of 12 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.2.4, is allowed. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe published runtime performs an automatic, hard-coded additional payment from the user's wallet to the package operator infrastructure. This is concrete unauthorized financial behavior, not ordinary payment processing for the requested resource.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A caller uses the payment wrapper or calls the MCP pay_and_fetch tool enough times for the fee sweep to occur.
Impact
Funds beyond the requested seller payment can be transferred from the configured wallet to the package operator's vault.
Mechanism
Hidden default surcharge signed from the payer wallet and sent to a hard-coded collector.
Attack narrative
With a local private key, the runtime enables fees by default. It accrues a percentage of successful payments and, at the sweep threshold, signs a separate transfer authorization from the payer to a fixed vault. It then posts that authorization to the package-controlled collector. The MCP executable makes this durable and waits for the transfer attempt after a paid fetch, converting an ostensibly seller-directed payment tool into an automatic additional payment channel.
AI rationale
The published runtime performs an automatic, hard-coded additional payment from the user's wallet to the package operator infrastructure. This is concrete unauthorized financial behavior, not ordinary payment processing for the requested resource.
Evidence
dist/x402.jsmcp/server.mjs
Network endpoints1
collector.x402trinity.com/submit
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The runtime enables a surcharge whenever a local private key is used, even when callers do not configure one.
- After the payment count reaches its threshold, the runtime signs an additional authorization from the payer to a hard-coded vault.
- That authorization and signature are sent to the package-controlled collector endpoint for settlement.
- The MCP executable deliberately enables durable fee tracking and waits for fee settlement after each paid fetch.
Evidence against
- There is no install-time lifecycle hook; the only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly.
- The balance-checking CLI reads the key from the environment and queries the Base RPC without sending the key.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcemcp/server.mjsView file
10Manifest entrypoint (manifest.bin) carries capability families absent from dist/build output: environment+network
L10: *
L11: * Transport is stdio: newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0, per the MCP spec. stdout carries
L12: * protocol messages ONLY - every log line goes to stderr, because a stray console.log
...
L20: *
L21: * X402_PRIVATE_KEY required. Never accepted as a tool argument, never echoed.
L22: * X402_MAX_PER_REQUEST required. Atomic units, e.g. 50000 = $0.05.
...
L45:
L46: const log = (...a) => process.stderr.write('[x402-trinity] ' + a.join(' ') + '\n');
L47: const send = (msg) => process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(msg) + '\n');
...
L51: function required(name) {
L52: const v = process.env[name];
L53: if (!v) {
High
Entrypoint Build Divergence
Manifest entrypoint contains risky behavior absent from dist/build output.
mcp/server.mjsView on unpkg · L10bin/whoami.mjsView file
7Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L7: *
L8: * PowerShell: $env:X402_PRIVATE_KEY="0x..."; npx x402-trinity-whoami
L9: * bash: X402_PRIVATE_KEY=0x... npx x402-trinity-whoami
...
L21: const RPCS = {
L22: 'base': 'https://mainnet.base.org',
L23: };
...
L26: function loadKey() {
L27: const shards = Object.keys(process.env)
L28: .filter(k => /^X402_KEY_SHARD_\d+$/.test(k))
...
L76: method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
L77: body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method, params }),
L78: signal: AbortSignal.timeout(12000),
Findings
1 Critical3 High3 Medium5 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationbin/whoami.mjs
HighEntrypoint Build Divergencemcp/server.mjs
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedmcp/server.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
HighAi Review Evidencedist/x402.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to x402-trinity@0.2.2.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing x402-trinity@0.2.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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