npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

Static source inspection confirms unconsented lifecycle mutation of ~/.claude/skills, a broad/foreign AI-agent control surface covered by the block policy. The planted content appears saf...

Under the install-control-surface policy, unconsented lifecycle writes into ~/.claude/skills are blockable AI-agent control hijack even when the content appears product-aligned. Other net...

The package appears to be a real OpenCode/NIM booster, but its postinstall performs unconsented registration into OpenCode agent configs and project config. Under the install-control-surf...

Although the plugin functionality and Webshare endpoints are product-aligned, npm lifecycle execution unconditionally registers the package into OpenCode user/home configs and drops proje...

Static source inspection confirms unconsented lifecycle-time mutation of a broad OpenCode AI-agent control surface, which is blockable under the install-control-surface policy. The proxy...

Static inspection confirms install-time execution of setup and package documentation states that setup creates a supervised daemon plus agent plugins. Under the provided policy, unconsent...

Although the functionality is package-aligned and documented, it lifecycle-mutates a broad Claude Code control surface in the user's home config without an interactive opt-in. Under the i...

Although product-aligned and documented, the package uses an npm lifecycle hook to mutate Claude Code user settings and install an agent hook without an explicit install command. Under th...

Static inspection confirms lifecycle-triggered MCP configuration mutation plus persistent service/global install behavior, which matches the firewall policy for unconsented AI-agent contr...

Static inspection confirms unconsented postinstall writes into a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface (.claude/skills, .claude/agents, .claude/commands), which is blockable under the in...

Source inspection confirms lifecycle code writes or rewrites broad foreign AI-agent MCP/config/instruction surfaces, which matches the blockable AI-agent control hijack policy. The behavi...

The wrapper's lifecycle hook triggers persistent daemon and AI-agent plugin setup at install time, which matches the blockable unconsented agent control-surface mutation policy even thoug...

The package performs unconsented install-time writes into foreign/broad AI-agent skill directories, which is blockable under the lifecycle control-surface policy even though the skill con...

The package is product-aligned, but its npm lifecycle unconditionally plants Claude Code skill instructions and scripts into ~/.claude, a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface, matching...

This matches the blockable policy category for unconsented npm lifecycle mutation of a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. The content appears product-aligned, but the delivery mechan...

Static inspection confirms unconsented install-time writes into ~/.claude/skills, a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface, plus lifecycle execution of copied Python setup code. Under the...

Although the skill content is product-aligned and classic credential theft was not found, the package uses npm postinstall to write package-supplied Claude instructions into ~/.claude and...

Source inspection confirms unconsented persistent mutation of broad/foreign AI-agent control surfaces from the package entrypoint, plus shell persistence and dangerous permission-bypass a...

This matches the firewall policy's blockable case: lifecycle-triggered, unconsented writes into foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces such as ~/.claude skills, ~/.claude.json MCP, and C...

Although there is no npm lifecycle hook, the package's primary bin command performs unprompted broad AI-agent control-surface mutation and persistence-like shell startup changes, then sup...

Static source inspection confirms lifecycle-triggered writes into ~/.claude/skills, a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface covered by the block policy. The absence of network exfiltrati...