npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The package contains a concrete unconsented `postinstall` mutation of global AI-agent instruction directories. Under the install-control-surface policy, this warrants blocking even though...

The package has a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign consumer project’s MCP configuration. No source-confirmed exfiltration, remote payload execution, or destructive b...

Source inspection confirms the critical behavior rather than merely scanner hints: npm postinstall injects a wildcard Claude Code hook into the consuming project. The hook captures tool-u...

Source inspection confirms the lifecycle hook injects a wildcard Claude Code hook into the consumer project, not merely first-party package configuration. The resulting handler processes...

Direct inspection confirms a concrete npm postinstall chain that modifies consumer-project MCP configuration and activates package code. Under the install-control-surface policy, this war...

Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall AI-agent control-surface hijack and configurable data-upload behavior. The localhost default does not remove the risk because the hook is...

The package performs concrete install-time writes to the user's Claude skill directory and executes follow-on tooling. That meets the firewall block boundary for unconsented postinstall m...

Source inspection confirms the lifecycle trigger and documents the resulting daemon and agent-plugin control changes. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented npm postinstall AI-age...

Direct source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall chain that writes AI-agent configuration into consumer projects. This meets the provided policy's blocking condition regardless...

Direct source inspection confirms an unconsented `postinstall` write to a consumer-owned Claude Code hook configuration with wildcard interception. Under the stated install-control-surfac...

Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall chain that writes package and remotely fetched content into ~/.claude/skills. Under the firewall policy, this warrants blocking regardles...

The lifecycle hook concretely writes AI-agent rule files into the consumer project during `npm install`. The non-overwrite guard and lack of network activity do not remove the unconsented...

The source confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of a global AI-agent extension/control surface and automatic installation of unrelated extensions. Although no exfiltration or destruc...

The package has a concrete unconsented postinstall chain that mutates a broad, user-level AI-agent control surface and installs foreign extensions. No exfiltration was found, but the life...

Source inspection confirms automatic postinstall mutation of foreign, global AI-agent instruction surfaces. Under the install-control-surface policy, this is concrete malicious behavior r...

Direct inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign/broad AI-agent configuration and instruction surfaces. The missing hook source limits one attempted hook pa...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall write to a foreign host project's AI-agent configuration surface. This meets the install-control-surface block boundary even though n...

Under the provided policy, unconsented npm postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface is blockable even when the behavior is package-aligned. The inspected source supports t...

The source confirms an unconsented postinstall write into a dependency-owned AI/OAuth sign-in callback surface, which matches the block policy even though the observed payload is cosmetic...

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time writes into Claude Code control files, including persistent hooks that affect later agent behavior. Under the provided policy, unconsented...

Source inspection confirms the scanner’s key finding: a postinstall hook mutates broad/foreign AI-agent control surfaces in the consumer project. Under the install-control-surface policy,...