npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

Source inspection confirms lifecycle code writes or rewrites broad foreign AI-agent MCP/config/instruction surfaces, which matches the blockable AI-agent control hijack policy. The behavi...

The wrapper's lifecycle hook triggers persistent daemon and AI-agent plugin setup at install time, which matches the blockable unconsented agent control-surface mutation policy even thoug...

The package performs unconsented install-time writes into foreign/broad AI-agent skill directories, which is blockable under the lifecycle control-surface policy even though the skill con...

The package is product-aligned, but its npm lifecycle unconditionally plants Claude Code skill instructions and scripts into ~/.claude, a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface, matching...

This matches the blockable policy category for unconsented npm lifecycle mutation of a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. The content appears product-aligned, but the delivery mechan...

Static inspection confirms unconsented install-time writes into ~/.claude/skills, a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface, plus lifecycle execution of copied Python setup code. Under the...

Although the skill content is product-aligned and classic credential theft was not found, the package uses npm postinstall to write package-supplied Claude instructions into ~/.claude and...

Source inspection confirms unconsented persistent mutation of broad/foreign AI-agent control surfaces from the package entrypoint, plus shell persistence and dangerous permission-bypass a...

This matches the firewall policy's blockable case: lifecycle-triggered, unconsented writes into foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces such as ~/.claude skills, ~/.claude.json MCP, and C...

Although there is no npm lifecycle hook, the package's primary bin command performs unprompted broad AI-agent control-surface mutation and persistence-like shell startup changes, then sup...

Static source inspection confirms lifecycle-triggered writes into ~/.claude/skills, a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface covered by the block policy. The absence of network exfiltrati...

The package performs an unconsented install-time write into ~/.claude/skills, a foreign AI-agent control surface, which matches the blockable AI-agent control hijack policy even though th...

Source inspection confirms install-time global Codex config mutation and remote MCP registration, matching the policy's blockable unconsented AI-agent control-surface write. The behavior...

The inspected source shows unconsented install-time mutation of ~/.claude/skills, a foreign AI-agent control surface covered by the block policy. Product-aligned content does not neutrali...

Static inspection confirms the scanner's critical finding: npm postinstall writes Claude skills and MCP registrations into user-level Claude control surfaces. Under the provided install-c...

Static inspection confirms unconsented install-time mutation of ~/.claude/skills, a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface, via package lifecycle script. Under the provided install contro...

This matches the blockable policy for unconsented lifecycle mutation of foreign or broad AI-agent control surfaces, even though the content appears package-aligned and no exfiltration end...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall writes into ~/.claude/skills, which the policy treats as blockable AI-agent control hijack even when the planted instructions are produc...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented lifecycle mutation of multiple foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, which the policy treats as blockable AI-agent control hijack even whe...

The package performs unconsented install-time delivery of package-supplied Claude skills into ~/.claude/skills, which matches the firewall policy for blockable AI-agent control hijack. Th...

Under the supplied policy, lifecycle code that drops package-supplied Claude/agent control files into a consumer project without consent is blockable even when content is product-aligned....