npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The source establishes an automatic postinstall path that invokes configuration of foreign AI clients without consent, meeting the blocking agent control-surface policy. Package-aligned d...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign user-level AI-agent control surface, which meets the supplied blocking policy. The verdict does not rely on scan...

Source establishes unconsented install-time mutation of a broad Claude control surface, which meets the blocking policy. The NextSpark dependency guard does not establish ownership of the...

Inspected source establishes automatic, unconsented postinstall mutation of shared AI-agent instructions and configuration, meeting the blocking policy. Environment skips and preservation...

The inspected lifecycle path performs unconsented global-install writes to foreign and shared AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the supplied blocking rule. The global-only gate, opt-out,...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. The verdict rests on the executable installation ch...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of OpenCode's user-wide agent control surface. This meets the blocking policy independently of scanner similarity labels or c...

Source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign global AI-agent instruction surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. Package-specific naming, collision checks, and an opt-out do n...

Inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy independently of scanner labels or unproven credential-...

Inspected source establishes automatic, unconsented mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, which meets the blocking policy. The NextSpark guard does not restrict writes to verified...

Source establishes unconsented install-time replacement of a foreign agent control surface, including deletion of existing rules and skills. This meets the blocking policy even without cr...

Inspected source proves automatic, unconsented mutation of two foreign global AI-agent control surfaces. The blocking decision rests on that lifecycle behavior, independently of scanner s...

Source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, global AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the supplied blocking policy. Package ownership of the registered server and preservat...

The inspected lifecycle chain performs automatic, unconsented writes to multiple foreign AI-agent skill directories. This meets the blocking policy for agent control-surface mutation rega...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy even though the installed instructions align wi...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the supplied blocking policy even though the skill serves package-r...

Source confirms unconsented npm postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the explicit blocking policy even though the installed delegation functional...

The inspected lifecycle chain performs unconsented writes to foreign agents' global instructions. This meets the explicit blocking rule for installation-time AI-agent control-surface muta...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign and shared AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. Blocking rests on the automatic instruction...

Source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, global AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the delegation feature's package alignment.

Source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a shared Pi agent instruction file, including a user-directory fallback. This meets the blocking rule for foreign or broad AI-agent...