npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The automatic lifecycle hook modifies both Codex and Claude user-level skill surfaces and prunes their contents. That concrete behavior meets the install-control-surface blocking policy e...

The postinstall hook persistently writes package-authored instructions into shared Codex and Claude directories. That concrete cross-agent control-surface mutation warrants blocking even...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, user-level AI-agent control surfaces. The lack of network activity does not remove the persistence and control-surface risk.

The automatic postinstall hook persistently injects and synchronizes package-controlled instructions in both Codex and Claude user directories. This satisfies the install-control-surface...

The postinstall hook silently mutates two foreign, user-wide AI-agent control surfaces and synchronizes their contents. This meets the install-control-surface block policy even though no...

The package uses an automatic lifecycle hook to execute remote code and install an AI-agent plugin outside the package itself. The global-only guard does not establish user consent for th...

This is malicious because an automatic lifecycle hook alters global Claude Code telemetry settings to export sensitive AI-session content. The opt-out does not establish prior consent.

The automatic postinstall changes both consumer-project and home-directory AI-agent configuration, including enabled MCP commands and a pre-tool hook. This meets the install-hook abuse bo...

The automatic postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces is a concrete malicious install-hook abuse under the policy. The absence of visible credential theft does no...

This package uses an automatic npm lifecycle hook to modify a global AI-agent configuration rather than requiring an explicit user setup action. The registered server can then execute rep...

The automatic postinstall mutation of a foreign Codex SDK is a concrete install-time AI-agent control-surface change. Static inspection found no secret theft or network activity in that l...

The package automatically injects persistent Claude Code hooks during installation, rather than limiting that agent integration to an explicit user command. This meets the install-time fo...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of the consumer project's Claude skill configuration. The absence of network or secret theft does not neutralize the automatic agent-control ta...

This package automatically installs an active Claude Code skill during npm postinstall and fetches a mutable remote extension. That is a concrete unconsented AI-agent control-surface muta...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The automatic lifecycle trigger and behavior-steering content meet the blocking policy.

The automatic global installation and persistent exposure of Claude Code meet the install-time foreign AI-agent control-surface policy. No self-dependency or secret theft is needed for th...

The package has a concrete automatic lifecycle path that overwrites both Codex and Claude skill directories. Under the install-control-surface policy, this is malicious install-hook abuse...

The automatic postinstall performs remote shell execution and changes Codex plugin configuration during installation. Its global-install guard limits exposure but does not establish conse...

The automatic postinstall hook modifies broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces and creates a fallback agent directory. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-hijack blocking policy.

The lifecycle hook automatically persists package-controlled skills and executable command hooks into the user's global Claude configuration. That concrete install-time agent-control muta...

The lifecycle hook automatically installs a foreign AI-agent CLI and persistently modifies user shell and application locations. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking boundary even t...