npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The package performs unconsented global postinstall mutation of multiple third-party AI-client configurations and installs remote executable payloads. The limited opt-out guards do not pr...

The source confirms an unconsented postinstall path that performs global AI-agent configuration changes with prompts disabled. No credential theft was found, but the automatic shared cont...

This package has a concrete automatic postinstall mutation of a consumer AI-agent configuration and configures an npx-backed MCP server. The opt-out and CI guards do not provide installat...

Source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall write to the consumer's AI-agent MCP configuration that configures npx to run another package. This meets the policy for an unconsented...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a consumer AI-agent control surface that registers a remotely resolved executable capability. The absence of direct secret theft does not re...

This package uses an automatic postinstall hook to add a consumer-wide MCP server that launches another npm package through npx. That is an unconsented install-time mutation of an AI-agen...

The package automatically mutates a consumer AI-agent control surface during postinstall and configures it to execute another package through npx. This meets the install-time control-surf...

The package performs silent, forced postinstall writes into multiple AI assistant configuration directories. That is a concrete unconsented broad agent-control-surface mutation, despite n...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, including enabled command definitions. Conflict protection does not remove the risk because a new worksp...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including workspace trust. The lifecycle behavior is concrete and sufficient to block even though the...

The postinstall lifecycle performs broad global Claude and Codex control-surface writes and registers continued execution on Codex turn completion. This meets the policy threshold for mal...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a consumer AI-agent control surface, combined with remote vendor-authorized content deployment. Signature verification does not remo...

The package uses an automatic npm lifecycle hook to write and prune skills in both Codex and Claude user directories. This is unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control...

The package performs unconsented postinstall writes and deletions in both Codex and Claude user skill locations. This meets the install-control-surface policy for blocking.

This package performs an automatic postinstall write to global Codex and Claude skill directories and prunes their contents. That concrete lifecycle control-surface mutation meets the blo...

The package automatically mutates the global Claude skills directory and installs instructions that take effect across Claude responses. This is unconsented install-time control-surface m...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall path that injects and prunes skills in two unrelated agent homes. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface abuse policy.

The confirmed postinstall hook modifies both Codex and Claude configuration trees without a user-invoked setup action. This meets the policy threshold for malicious install-hook abuse eve...

A registry-install lifecycle hook modifies both Codex and Claude user skill directories and prunes their contents without an explicit user setup action. This meets the install-time AI-age...

The package performs broad, forced AI-agent configuration writes during npm postinstall without user invocation. This meets the install-control-surface block policy even though the instal...

The postinstall hook silently overwrites a global AI-agent instruction file outside the package and consumer project. This meets the policy for malicious install-time AI-agent control hij...