npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The concrete install-time deletion of existing AI credentials and automatic replacement with a vendor key establishes an AI-agent control-surface hijack. Vendor-aligned networking does no...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple AI-agent configurations and workspace trust state. This meets the firewall block boundary regardless of the scanner simil...

The package performs unconsented global postinstall mutation of third-party AI-agent integrations, meeting the blocking control-surface policy. Additional host security changes and unchec...

Source inspection confirms an install-time command that automatically changes Claude Code's user-level skill directory. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented postinstall mutation...

The package performs confirmed postinstall writes to multiple global AI-agent configuration locations. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the absence of confirmed credential exf...

The package performs automatic postinstall replacement of skills across unrelated agent homes, including Codex and Claude. That is a concrete AI-agent control-surface hijack even though n...

The package performs unconsented postinstall writes to broad user-global Claude skill paths using remotely supplied content and names. This is a concrete AI-agent control-surface mutation...

The package performs forced, silent postinstall writes to multiple foreign AI-agent configuration locations. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented lifecycle mutation of a broad A...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of the user's Claude Code control surface, including high-permission agent content and MCP registration. That meets the package firewall...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of global Claude Code settings and executable command registration. This meets the blocking policy for a foreign, broad AI-a...

The package crosses the block boundary because postinstall automatically starts a process that can modify foreign Claude workspace controls. The local destination and safety checks reduce...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of global Claude Code files and injects an MCP server that automatically installs another package. This meets the blocking policy for...

This package uses an unconsented postinstall hook to create broad AI-agent control files outside its own directory. That is a concrete foreign control-surface mutation and meets the block...

The global-install guard limits scope but does not obtain separate consent before modifying foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy for install-time external AI-...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall installation and MCP registration across foreign AI coding agents. This meets the blocking policy for lifecycle mutation of a broad AI-a...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a project AI-agent control surface, including enabled remote package execution paths. Collision protection and bundle signature checks...

This is concrete postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including automatic workspace-trust acceptance. The lifecycle guard only limits it to global installs;...

This package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, user-wide Claude Code control surface. That concrete persistence and hook registration meets the blocking policy even...

The package performs unconsented post-install mutation of foreign, user-level AI-agent configuration and extension directories. This meets the firewall block boundary despite the changes...

The automatic postinstall registration changes an external AI-agent/browser integration without an explicit user action. This is a concrete unconsented lifecycle control-surface mutation,...

Source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall mutation of several foreign AI-agent configuration surfaces. This meets the blocking policy even though the installer avoids overwritin...