npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The source proves automatic install-time mutation of global Claude Code command settings with consent prompts bypassed. This meets the supplied blocking policy for a foreign AI-agent cont...

The inspected lifecycle chain performs unconsented install-time mutation of foreign, global AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the explicit blocking policy. Package ownership of the injec...

The inspected lifecycle chain performs unconsented writes to foreign global AI-agent control surfaces, including Gemini's instruction file. This meets the blocking policy even though the...

The inspected lifecycle chain performs unconsented postinstall mutation across foreign AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the supplied blocking policy. Transactional writes and packag...

Inspected source proves an automatic, unconsented postinstall write to Pi's global agent control surface. Under the supplied policy, this warrants blocking despite guards that preserve ex...

Source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, meeting the explicit blocking policy. The package-aligned collector and backup behavior do not neutrali...

The inspected postinstall chain performs unconsented mutation of foreign agent configurations and instructions, meeting the explicit blocking policy. Package-aligned commands and idempote...

The inspected lifecycle performs unconsented mutation of a broad AI-agent instruction surface, meeting the specified blocking policy. The concrete global instruction write establishes the...

The inspected automatic postinstall chain performs unconsented writes to foreign global AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the specified blocking boundary. Package-owned integration names...

The inspected lifecycle chain performs unconsented installation-time writes to global Gemini instructions and Claude server configuration. This meets the supplied blocking rule for foreig...

Source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including overwrite and pruning behavior. This meets the supplied blocking rule despite the limited sk...

Source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign global AI-agent instruction and tool configuration. This meets the supplied blocking rule despite package-aligned content an...

The inspected lifecycle chain performs unconsented install-time mutation of Gemini's global agent instruction file. This crosses the specified blocking boundary for foreign or broad AI-ag...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, global AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy despite the package-aligned purpose and file bac...

Inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, user-wide AI-agent control surface. This meets the supplied blocking policy despite runtime hook guards.

The inspected lifecycle chain performs unconsented install-time mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, meeting the supplied blocking policy. The personal-file whitelist does not gu...

The inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface. This meets the supplied blocking policy even though the replacement instructions appear c...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of global Claude instructions, meeting the supplied blocking policy. Interactive prompts and preservation of existing content...

The inspected postinstall path performs unconsented mutation of the consumer project's AI-agent instructions. This meets the supplied blocking rule for automatic lifecycle writes to a for...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation across foreign AI-agent control surfaces. Package-specific naming and directory existence checks do not provide consent for t...

The source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, which meets the explicit blocking rule. Same-vendor binaries and the PATH prerequisite do not...