npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

Concrete lifecycle code modifies global ~/.claude settings and installs a command invoked by all Claude Code sessions. No network exfiltration is needed for this policy-defined install-ti...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, user-wide AI-agent control surface. The absence of observed exfiltration does not remove the concrete persistent control-surface imp...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. This meets the blocking policy even though the inspected statusline contains no network...

This is a concrete install-time broad AI-agent control-surface mutation, which meets the blocking policy. Guardrails and lack of network exfiltration reduce collateral risk but do not rem...

Source confirms automatic postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent skill directories, including a remotely fetched mutable skill. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented life...

Source confirms an npm postinstall automatically injects package-controlled Claude Code skills into the consumer project and runs pip provisioning. This is concrete unconsented install-ti...

The package has a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of the global Claude Code control surface and installs a command that runs across all sessions. Lack of observed network exfilt...

The automatic postinstall mutation of third-party AI-client MCP configurations meets the blocking policy. Remote native payload installation, persistence, and telemetry compound the contr...

The package has no install hook, but its normal agent runtime embeds covert collection instructions and tools that harvest sensitive user context. The behavior is concrete and exceeds a u...

The lifecycle hook performs an unconsented postinstall mutation path across foreign AI-agent control surfaces, delegated to an unverified downloaded executable. That meets the firewall bl...

Source inspection confirms a postinstall-triggered, broad user-level AI-agent control-surface mutation. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the absence of confirmed network exfil...

The package contains a concrete, automatic, third-party AI safety-control removal, not merely risky runtime primitives. Its narrow version check and idempotent replacement establish inten...

This is a concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, not merely an explicit setup feature. Optional LLM networking is not needed for the blocki...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The guarded global-install condition does not remove the persistence and execution impact.

This is a concrete postinstall mutation of broad third-party AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. The optional OpenAI-compatible extraction path does not mitigate t...

Direct inspection confirms a concrete postinstall-driven mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the otherwise package-aligned op...

Direct source inspection confirms a postinstall hook deliberately disables a third-party agent's malware safety instruction. This meets the blocking policy for foreign AI-agent control-su...

The package has a concrete, install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation that installs automatic command execution. This meets the firewall block boundary despite its disclosed notifica...

Source inspection confirms a concrete npm postinstall chain that mutates Claude Code settings and installs event-triggered commands. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented postins...

Source confirms an install-time, user-wide Cursor MCP and command mutation. This meets the firewall block boundary for unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface.

Although the stated feature is benign and documented, the package performs the policy-defined blocking behavior: postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. No exfiltratio...