npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

Source confirms an install-time, user-wide Cursor MCP and command mutation. This meets the firewall block boundary for unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface.

Although the stated feature is benign and documented, the package performs the policy-defined blocking behavior: postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. No exfiltratio...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad Claude project controls, plus a telemetry chain that accesses session metadata and transcript-derived usage. This m...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent configuration and permission surfaces. This meets the firewall block boundary regardless of t...

The postinstall hook concretely deletes foreign AI runtime packages during installation. Global-only scope and opt-outs reduce breadth but do not make the unconsented lifecycle mutation s...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block boundary even though no install-time exfiltration was found.

Source confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block policy regardless of the installer’s lack of network activ...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent environments, coupled with remote native payload installation. The source establishes the behavior directly.

Source confirms an unconsented install-time mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. Per policy, this is a publish-block condition despite the absence of credential exfiltra...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the block boundary. No exfiltration or remote payload is needed for this concrete control-surface at...

Source confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of ~/.agents/skills, a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the unrelated CLI and Git-h...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, combined with remote executable retrieval and host-level configuration changes. The global-install...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, compounded by unauthenticated remote binary execution and host configuration changes.

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. The absence of a hard-coded exfiltration host does not remov...

This is a concrete postinstall-time mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, including automatic Codex plugin enablement. The absence of install-time networking does not remov...

The lifecycle hook performs active AI-agent configuration and hook installation in the consumer project without an explicit user command. This meets the blocking policy even though no net...

This is unconsented install-time destructive mutation of an AI CLI credential/control surface coupled with automatic account provisioning. It exceeds a safe legacy migration or ordinary C...

Source confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. The package-aligned skill content and checksum ch...

The source confirms a concrete postinstall mutation of several foreign/broad agent control surfaces, meeting the block policy. The benign-looking skill content and checksum check do not r...

The installer directly performs broad, persistent global agent-control-surface writes during postinstall. User-invoked network/credential tooling does not negate that install-time behavior.

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a shared/foreign AI-agent credential surface, not a user-invoked migration. The competing-service marker deletion and credential repla...