npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The lifecycle behavior is concrete and package-controlled, not a scanner-only inference. It meets the firewall block rule for unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent co...

The automatic postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent skill directories is a concrete unconsented control-surface write. Source inspection found no remote payload fetch, but that does no...

Direct inspection confirms an npm postinstall mutates the foreign global Claude Code control surface and installs persistent hooks. The prior-setup guard limits reach but does not establi...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. No exfiltration is needed for this verdict.

The install hook concretely performs unconsented, broad foreign AI-agent control-surface writes. The absence of lifecycle network exfiltration does not remove this policy-defined blocking...

The package has a concrete install-time, unconsented mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces. Although no credential exfiltration or remote payload was found, this behavior me...

Concrete source shows unconsented postinstall mutation of a consuming project's package.json and Cursor rules. This meets the firewall block policy regardless of the absence of network ex...

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time OpenClaw control-surface changes and gateway exposure. The OpenClaw-presence guard does not establish user consent.

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface and includes recursive replacement of its destination. No exfiltration is needed for this concrete contro...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad/foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The lack of installer exfiltration does not mitigate the persistence and control-surface hi...

This is a concrete postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, compounded by automatic persistence. Safeguards and lack of observed exfiltration do not establish con...

The package’s primary assets appear package-aligned, but its automatic postinstall performs broad, active AI-agent and MCP configuration changes in every consuming project. That concrete...

The install hook performs unconsented mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent skill control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy even though the inspected installer shows no separate exfi...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface and a concrete token-bearing outbound flow. These exceed a same-vendor setup shim an...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of a consuming project's broad AI-agent control surface plus Git-hook persistence. This meets the firewall block boundary regar...

The lifecycle hook performs concrete, unconsented replacement of broad foreign AI-agent skill locations. This meets the install-control-surface blocking boundary despite no observed insta...

Source inspection confirms the critical finding: an automatic npm lifecycle hook replaces Codex and Claude Code skill directories. Disclosure in documentation does not make this opt-in ag...

The confirmed postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent skill directories meets the blocking policy, even though no separate payload exfiltration was found.

Source inspection confirms install-time mutation of a consuming project’s Claude control files. This meets the firewall block boundary despite otherwise benign template content.

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy despite no observed data exfiltration or remote payload e...

The runtime MCP service is package-aligned, but its postinstall hook silently patches a third-party OAuth consent control surface. That install-time mutation is concrete and can extend be...