npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The confirmed postinstall chain mutates a broad foreign AI-agent control surface and establishes persistence. This meets the block policy despite package-aligned loopback networking and r...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces, coupled with remote binary execution. It meets the blocking policy regardless of package...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, accompanied by persistence. Localhost binding does not remove the control-hijack risk becaus...

Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall write into Codex's global skills directory. That behavior meets the firewall block boundary regardless of otherwise package-aligned API a...

The lifecycle behavior meets the block boundary: npm postinstall mutates multiple foreign global AI-agent control surfaces without an explicit user setup command. Lack of download/exfiltr...

The concrete install-time writes to multiple foreign global AI-agent control surfaces meet the blocking policy. Hardened OpenCode permission defaults do not remove the unconsented lifecyc...

The package’s automatic postinstall performs broad, persistent AI-agent control-surface writes outside the consuming project. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the absence of o...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces. The absence of observed install-time exfiltration does not remove that block-level behavior.

The automatic cross-host agent-control mutations meet the install-control-surface blocking rule. Lack of observed exfiltration does not remove that concrete install-time persistence/contr...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of several global AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the install-control-surface block criterion regardless of benign...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of several foreign global AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. The token-handling runtime path further i...

The concrete postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces meets the block boundary. Hardened OpenCode defaults and lack of observed exfiltration do not remove the unco...

The lifecycle behavior is a concrete unconsented cross-vendor AI-agent control-surface mutation, meeting the blocking policy. No separate exfiltration chain is needed for this verdict.

The source confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces. Safety checks and lack of network exfiltration do not remove that concrete persistence...

The package's postinstall concretely changes foreign global agent configuration, including Codex's generic default agent. Global-only guarding and non-overwrite behavior reduce collateral...

The package's proxy functionality is package-aligned, but its automatic global postinstall configures foreign Codex and Claude control surfaces, including the generic Codex default agent....

This is an unconsented npm postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, coupled with unverified remote native payload execution and persistence. It meets the firewall...

The install hook performs concrete, unconsented mutation of broad browser/AI-agent control surfaces, not merely an explicit user-command setup. The absence of observed credential exfiltra...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad foreign AI-agent control surface, plus execution of an unpinned globally fetched package. The lifecycle behavior meets the blo...

The package contains no confirmed exfiltration chain, but its automatic lifecycle hook installs executable agent instructions across unrelated AI-agent platforms. That meets the firewall...

The package has no confirmed exfiltration or remote execution, but its postinstall hook concretely and unconsentedly installs active instructions into broad third-party AI-agent control s...