npm credential and data exfiltration reports.

The postinstall chain performs unconsented remote identity/account administration against a fixed external host using embedded default credentials, not merely local development-tool setup...

The lifecycle hook performs concrete identity disclosure and remote account mutation using embedded defaults. Its stated developer-tool purpose does not justify automatic transmission of...

The package performs automatic, privileged external account mutation based on a local identity during postinstall, not an explicit user command. Its local configuration and hook writes ma...

This is concrete install-time mutation and data transfer to an external service, not a benign scanner primitive. The fixed remote service, automatic user/password handling, and elevated p...

The source establishes a direct collection-to-network path for local identity, device fingerprint, and Figma identifiers without an in-source consent control. This is concrete data exfilt...

Runtime source establishes a hardcoded external receiver plus automatic authorization and refresh-token forwarding. The lack of install hooks does not mitigate this browser-time credentia...

The source establishes a concrete, default credential-exfiltration path to a third-party endpoint during ordinary package use. No install hook is needed for this runtime behavior to be ma...

Direct source inspection confirms automatic transmission of runtime environment secrets to a fixed external endpoint. The lack of install-time execution does not remove the concrete crede...

The source implements an authenticated upload of environment-derived secret values to a hard-coded external host. No install hook exists, but the runtime data flow is concrete and unsafe.

The import-time IP-harvesting and Slack submission chain is directly present in package source and reachable through an exported entrypoint. This is malicious behavior despite the absence...

Source directly implements clipboard and screenshot upload to a remote endpoint, with concealment features. The absence of an install hook limits automatic activation but does not remove...

The embedded active webhook configuration and automatic runtime POST path establish concrete unconsented data exfiltration. The lack of an install hook does not mitigate this runtime beha...

The package contains hardcoded externally controlled webhook destinations that are enabled by default for runtime features and transmit serialized application records. This is concrete da...

This is a concrete, default-enabled runtime data-exfiltration path to hard-coded external recipients, not merely configurable application telemetry. The absence of install hooks does not...

Source confirms an automated credential upload path, not merely network or environment-variable use. Lack of npm lifecycle hooks does not mitigate the generated CI workflow's secret exfil...

This package contains a concrete, runtime-reachable data-exfiltration chain: ordinary authenticated agent launches silently start a detached process that exports and uploads conversation...

This is concrete default-enabled data exfiltration to a hardcoded external endpoint, not merely local worklog functionality. The absence of an npm install hook does not remove the runtime...

Direct source inspection confirms an install-time exfiltration chain with command execution, credential-adjacent file reads, and a fixed external HTTP receiver. This is malicious behavior...

Source directly establishes collection of device identifiers and their transmission to an unrelated endpoint when the generator is used. Although it is user-command triggered rather than...

The package has no install hook, but its runtime code automatically uploads selected CI environment secrets to a hardcoded remote endpoint. This is concrete credential exfiltration, not m...

The hard-coded remote service, embedded privileged defaults, account mutation, whole-project source scanning, and automatic persistent setup form a concrete unconsented attack chain.