npm credential and data exfiltration reports.

Source confirms a hardcoded non-HTTPS IP default receiving bearer-authenticated activity uploads. The absence of lifecycle scripts limits propagation but does not remove the concrete cred...

Source confirms a default-enabled remote reporting path for data derived from Claude activity, rather than merely local dashboard telemetry. This is concrete unconsented data exfiltration...

The package contains concrete runtime credential-disclosure and automatic remote logging behavior, plus embedded fallback secrets and global TLS bypass. The absence of install hooks limit...

Source establishes a concrete runtime credential disclosure to a hard-coded external endpoint. No install-time hook is involved, but the user-triggered route provides a direct exfiltratio...

Although npm installation itself has no lifecycle hook, the package’s intended installed runtime automatically sends collected work-report data to a hardcoded external IP by default. This...

Concrete runtime credential exfiltration to an unrelated endpoint is present. Lack of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate the activated payload.

The package contains a concrete automatic remote exfiltration path for potentially credential-bearing account configuration. Its package-local postinstall behavior does not mitigate this...

This is concrete credential exfiltration triggered by normal module import, with obfuscation and self-removal for concealment. The legitimate codec exports do not mitigate the appended ma...

Concrete, default-enabled export of collected developer activity to a hard-coded external endpoint establishes data exfiltration. The lack of an npm install lifecycle hook does not mitiga...

This is concrete default-on data exfiltration to a hardcoded public receiver after installation, not merely a user-configured reporting feature. The absence of an npm install lifecycle ho...

Source confirms conditional but automatic upload of environment secrets to a fixed default external endpoint. The absence of lifecycle hooks reduces install-time risk but does not remove...

The concrete automatic credential-transfer path to a fixed external receiver is sufficient for a block verdict. The lack of install hooks limits the trigger but does not remove the CI exf...

The package embeds a default external receiver and transmits operational records without an explicit consumer opt-in at the call site. The absence of install hooks limits the trigger but...

Hard-coded reads of unrelated local secret files combined with authenticated outbound requests establish credential-exfiltration behavior. The lack of lifecycle hooks limits automatic act...

This is concrete credential exfiltration in a normal runtime initialization path, despite no install-time lifecycle hook. The scanner similarity is unnecessary to the verdict.

Source inspection confirms a concrete runtime data-exfiltration path in both distributed entrypoints. The absence of install hooks does not mitigate the malicious library-call behavior.

Source establishes a direct remote logging sink and sensitive account/configuration inputs reaching it. The absence of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate the runtime exfiltration behavior.

Direct inspection establishes an install-triggered surveillance and remote-control chain, plus optional persistence. This is concrete malicious behavior, not a noisy binary-artifact signal.

The source implements concrete, unconsented install-time host-data exfiltration to external endpoints. The stated research purpose does not remove the active collection and transmission b...

The package deliberately exfiltrates caller-supplied decode input to an unrelated endpoint in both distributed entrypoints. This is concrete runtime data exfiltration, despite no install-...

A base encoding library has no legitimate need to transmit every decode input to an unrelated IP address. The concrete, duplicated runtime exfiltration behavior warrants blocking.