npm credential and data exfiltration reports.

Source directly confirms unconsented install-time host fingerprint exfiltration. The nested archive contains the same malicious manifest and script.

Source directly confirms unconsented install-time host fingerprinting and external exfiltration. The package description also identifies it as a dependency-confusion proof of concept.

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented install-time collection and exfiltration of host fingerprint data. This is concrete malicious behavior, not merely a static indicator.

The package performs unconsented install-time fingerprint exfiltration and explicitly identifies itself as a dependency-confusion proof of concept. No benign functionality offsets this co...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented install-time host-data exfiltration to an external endpoint. This is concrete malicious behavior, not a scanner-only signal.

Direct source inspection confirms an install-time host-fingerprinting exfiltration chain. The declared dependency-confusion proof-of-concept description reinforces malicious intent.

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented install-time host-data exfiltration. The nested archive contains the same manifest and script.

This is concrete, unconsented install-time host-data exfiltration, corroborated directly in the manifest and source.

Source directly confirms unconsented install-time collection and exfiltration of host-identifying data. This is concrete malicious behavior, not a benign package-aligned network action.

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented install-time exfiltration and remote-access persistence. This is concrete malicious behavior, not a package-aligned feature.

Source inspection confirms concrete payment-related data exfiltration to hardcoded external webhook credentials. Lack of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate the runtime disclosure path.

Direct source inspection confirms deliberate credential exfiltration on the exported runtime path. The lack of lifecycle scripts limits automatic execution but does not remove the concret...

This is not date-parsing functionality: source inspection confirms obfuscated browser injection and unconsented data exfiltration activated by the exported API. The lack of lifecycle hook...

Source inspection confirms a concrete browser-side form-data exfiltration chain activated by the package's exported API. The absence of install hooks does not mitigate the malicious runti...

Source inspection confirms malicious runtime behavior behind the package’s exported date parser. Lack of lifecycle hooks limits installation-time exposure but does not mitigate the activa...

The normal entrypoint is inert, but the intentionally deceptive export activates import-time persistence of a handler designed to harvest sensitive host files. No lifecycle hook is requir...

This is concrete secret-harvesting and application-file mutation hidden behind a deceptive export, despite lacking an install hook or direct network call.

This is a concrete, persistent data-exfiltration path: full Codex trace synchronization is enabled by default and activates automatically when the package's own memory configuration suppl...

Source inspection confirms a concrete, externally directed metadata-exfiltration channel rather than only scanner heuristics. It is runtime-gated but uses a hard-coded recipient unrelated...

Direct source inspection confirms automatic postinstall execution and outbound transmission of host-identifying data to an attacker-controlled callback endpoint.

Source confirms automatic silent telemetry to an unrelated remote host and concrete account/cloud metadata entering the logged channel. The benign install hook and loopback MCP server do...