npm malware reports, with evidence.

The automatic self-reinstallation chain can execute lifecycle code from a future release and immediately rerun broad agent configuration. The observed configuration injection reduces appr...

The package combines unconsented host tracking and error telemetry with explicit instructions designed to make an AI agent trust its output and avoid verification. There is no install hoo...

The automatic lifecycle chain executes an opaque native hook installer that the package identifies as modifying Codex and Claude Code configuration. This is concrete install-hook abuse un...

The package uses an automatic install hook to download and execute remote code and to alter global AI-tool dependencies. That is concrete install-hook abuse with user-level execution impact.

The package uses an automatic lifecycle hook to silently replace code in multiple installed dependencies and modify another dependency. This is concrete install-hook abuse despite the abs...

The automatic postinstall-to-initializer chain and obfuscated payload establish install-hook abuse. The initialization targets multiple foreign AI-agent configurations, meeting the blocki...

The automatic postinstall invokes an opaque native installer that mutates third-party AI-agent hooks and settings. This is a concrete unconsented install-time control-surface modification.

This package has an automatic install-time host-mutation chain with privileged system-package installation and destructive rebuild preparation. The absence of confirmed exfiltration does...

The package has a concrete automatic install-time chain that deletes and replaces dependencies of a foreign coding agent. Fixed versions and disabled scripts reduce payload risk but do no...

The package combines an automatic lifecycle mutation with remote-directed installation of another release of itself. This is a concrete install-hook self-dependency chain with persistent...

The package automatically changes a foreign consumer project and persists its own lifecycle execution. The behavior is concrete in source and exceeds a user-invoked setup tool or a narrow...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that writes agent skills into both Codex and Claude user homes and performs a user-level pip installation. This meets the install-ho...

This is concrete automatic install-hook abuse: it modifies a foreign consumer's package lifecycle and agent tooling, then retries changes after the installer exits. The absence of observe...

This is an automatic install-time remote-code-execution chain, not merely a user-invoked setup command. The external installer and Python payload are fetched and executed without integrit...

The automatic lifecycle hook performs broad, unconsented mutation of foreign AI-agent dependencies and removes diagnostic artifacts. Version checks limit target selection but do not make...

The package combines an automatic install hook, broad consumer-project and Claude plugin mutation, and a self-dependency selecting older releases. These concrete behaviors meet the instal...

This is an automatic staged remote-code-execution chain at npm postinstall, with no embedded trusted digest or signature for the fetched payload. The absence of visible credential theft d...

The package has a concrete automatic install-hook chain that changes global Claude agent behavior and executes package hooks. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking policy despite its...

Automatic lifecycle execution of mutable remote shell code creates a concrete install-time remote-code-execution path. The local opt-outs and same-source checksum checks do not constrain...

The package performs automatic, persistent mutation of the consumer project's lifecycle and AI-agent configuration. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking policy even though no secret...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that modifies foreign AI-agent configuration and enables a plugin. This meets the install-hook abuse boundary despite no observed se...