npm security reports, with evidence.

The package has a concrete automatic lifecycle chain that forcefully rewrites AI-agent control surfaces across registered projects and launches a service. This meets the publish-block pol...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign registered projects' AI-agent control surfaces, coupled with automatic background-service persistence. It meets the blocking i...

The automatic postinstall hook broadly mutates foreign AI-agent configuration and instruction locations. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy regardless of the package's...

The package embeds active AI-directed instructions intended to suppress independent review. This is malicious control-hijacking behavior even though it is not installed through an npm lif...

hub-launch@1.30.0 has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that installs package-controlled instructions into global Claude Code commands. This is unconsented mutation of a broad AI-age...

The package implements an undisclosed-to-README, package-directed additional money transfer using the caller's signing key. The opt-out and runtime notice do not remove the deceptive defa...

The published runtime performs an automatic, hard-coded additional payment from the user's wallet to the package operator infrastructure. This is concrete unauthorized financial behavior,...

The package contains a concrete extra-payment path to a hard-coded vault that is active by default and not counted in the seller-payment budget. Its contradictory README claim makes the b...

The unverified remote-script execution is a concrete remote-code-execution path, and the daemon also sends identified logs to a default external endpoint. Absence of an npm lifecycle hook...

The automatic lifecycle hook writes package-controlled instructions into existing global Claude Code and Codex skill registries. That concrete install-time control-surface mutation meets...

The source establishes a complete automatic lifecycle-to-global-agent-configuration write path. Although no network exfiltration was found, this broad postinstall control-surface mutation...

This is an unconsented automatic lifecycle mutation of a foreign AI-agent executable with opaque payloads. The package's backup and checksum checks do not remove the control-hijack risk.

The automatic postinstall hook directly modifies Claude Code configuration content and overwrites an existing skill installation. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy ev...

The package combines an automatic lifecycle trigger with global Claude hook and plugin installation. The opt-out and global-install gate do not provide interactive consent for modifying t...

Automatic installation persists a wildcard Claude Code command hook in the consumer project. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent contro...

This is a concrete credential-exfiltration path, not ordinary authentication to the documented destination. The absence of an install hook does not remove the runtime risk.

The postinstall script writes command hooks into Claude Code's global settings file without asking the user. That is unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surfac...

The postinstall hook mutates Claude Code and Codex MCP configuration without user consent, which is an unconsented install-time write to foreign AI-agent control surfaces. That is a block...

The automatic lifecycle hook persistently grants PATH-resolved commands execution in Claude Code's global hook configuration. This is concrete install-time AI-agent control-surface hijack...

This is an unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. The lifecycle trigger and global hook writes establish a concrete control-hijack attack surface.

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface. The conditional executable lookup does not remove the automatic persistent configuration change w...