npm detections from LPM Firewall.

This is an unconsented install-time data-exfiltration payload. The automatic lifecycle trigger, local account reconnaissance, and fixed external POST establish concrete malicious behavior.

This package automatically rewrites consumer Next.js and AI configuration during postinstall, then supplies interception code that exports LLM conversation content. The lifecycle mutation...

The package contains a concrete silent postinstall chain that writes into global control files for multiple unrelated AI-agent tools. This meets the policy threshold for unconsented insta...

The source establishes a default-on remote transmission of an authentication token and user-associated telemetry, not merely an inert network primitive. No lifecycle hook is needed for th...

The package performs an automatic postinstall write into broad project agent configuration and can create new agent files in a repository that has not explicitly requested setup. The inje...

The source establishes a concrete prompt and project-metadata exfiltration path through automatic configuration and broad Claude Code hooks. The package-local postinstall does not offset...

This is a concrete install-hook supply-chain risk: automatic retrieval and staging of an unverified native executable with TLS verification disabled. No self-contained credential theft is...

This package uses an automatic install hook to persist instructions into unrelated AI-agent configuration files and steer future agents toward financially and credential-sensitive capabil...

The published runtime bundle contains a concrete, automatically triggered browser-disruption payload. The absence of an npm lifecycle hook does not mitigate runtime protestware affecting...

The package has a reachable postinstall path that mutates several foreign AI-agent control surfaces and enables network access. Its installed instructions require remote content, creating...

The automatic lifecycle hook deletes credentials associated with other AI providers and replaces configuration with a vendor-provisioned key. That is an unconsented install-time mutation...

Automatic postinstall code modifies global Claude Code hooks, MCP configuration, and permissions. This concrete agent-control takeover meets the install-hook abuse blocking boundary.

This package has a complete automatic lifecycle chain that writes bundled instructions into the user-wide Claude Code control surface. The foreign, broad agent configuration mutation is c...

The automatic postinstall mutation of a consumer AI-agent control surface meets the blocking policy. No network activity is needed for this concrete install-time control-surface takeover.

The package executes a remotely downloaded shell script automatically from postinstall. Safe mode and opt-out variables do not make the default install-time remote execution consensual.

The automatic postinstall modifies foreign, user-wide AI-agent configuration and installs an MCP command that resolves the latest release at launch. This meets the install-control-surface...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that overwrites a foreign AI-agent executable with opaque payloads. That meets the install-control-surface blocking policy despite b...

The bundled all-sites credential collector defaults to transmitting saved logins to an external domain, creating a concrete credential-exfiltration path. The lack of an npm install hook d...

The package contains a complete, automatically invoked path that fingerprints coding-agent and sandbox environments and transmits the resulting identifiers. Although it has no install hoo...

The automatic hook mutates and activates integrations across unrelated AI-agent configurations, which is concrete install-hook abuse. This meets the blocking policy even without evidence...

This is an automatic install-time remote-code execution chain that can mutate the installing machine through unpinned external content. The global-install gate limits reach but does not r...