npm detections from LPM Firewall.

The automatic postinstall hook performs unconsented system-level package installation and can request elevated privileges. This is concrete install-hook abuse, not a user-invoked setup ac...

The automatic lifecycle hook modifies third-party AI-agent source and searches broadly for targets. This meets the install-hook abuse block policy despite the visible patches appearing UI...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that mutates both consumer-project and user-wide AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the install-control-surface blocking boundary...

The package combines an automatic lifecycle trigger with unconsented mutation of the consumer repository and detached process launch. Although no exfiltration was confirmed, these install...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall path that writes and deletes under both Codex and Claude skill directories. This meets the policy for malicious install-hook abuse even wi...

The automatic postinstall hook modifies several unrelated AI-agent instruction surfaces and inserts directives for wallet and password capabilities. This is concrete AI-agent control hija...

The package has an automatic lifecycle hook that writes broad foreign AI-agent and editor configuration into the consuming project. The installed configuration adds remote MCP access and...

The package has a concrete automatic lifecycle chain that broadly mutates foreign AI-agent control surfaces and the user environment. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking policy reg...

The automatic postinstall hook changes a foreign shared AI-agent configuration by installing bundled agents and commands. That meets the blocking policy even though the source does not sh...

The automatic lifecycle hook overwrites a global AI CLI command owned outside this package rather than only configuring package-owned files. The absence of observed network or credential...

The automatic postinstall performs unconsented, broad mutation of consumer AI-agent configuration and installs executable control hooks. This meets the blocking policy even though the ins...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces. The installed capability also drives automated access-evasion behavior, so it meets the inst...

The package uses an automatic postinstall to mutate consumer project agent configuration and persist its own future execution in the consumer package.json. This meets the install-hook abu...

The package combines automatic lifecycle execution with unvalidated remote AI command execution in the user's shell. This is a concrete remote-code-execution attack surface, not merely or...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that broadly changes consumer-project Claude configuration and installs agent plugins. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking bo...

This is an automatic install-time takeover of a global AI-agent command outside the package directory. The global-install guard and absence of visible JavaScript exfiltration do not remov...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces and a user Python environment. That is concrete install-hook abuse under the stated policy.

Source inspection confirms a user-triggered credential-redirection and persistence path to a fixed gateway. The absence of install hooks lowers propagation risk but does not remove the cr...

This is an automatic postinstall write to a foreign, behavior-bearing AI-agent control surface, with recursive overwrite semantics. That concrete install-time mutation meets the blocking...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of both Codex and Claude user skill directories, plus user-level dependency installation. This is concrete install-hook abuse under t...

The automatic postinstall hook modifies global Cursor agent configuration and skills, rather than requiring an explicit user setup action. This meets the install-hook abuse boundary for a...