npm security reports, with evidence.

This is a concrete automatic postinstall mutation of a foreign, global AI-agent control surface. The behavior meets the install-control-surface blocking rule regardless of the absence of...

This package performs unconsented install-time host mutation through privileged package-manager commands and repeats it at runtime. Its additional credential harvesting and network use ma...

This is an unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. The automatic hook registration meets the blocking policy even though the payload binaries are not incl...

The bridge combines deliberate evasion with an unrestricted AI-agent launcher, and the distributed code is intentionally obscured. The absence of a consumer lifecycle hook limits installa...

The package contains a concrete automatic remote logging path to package-embedded webhook URLs and serializes potentially sensitive application records for it. This is data exfiltration b...

The package contains a concrete automatic postinstall chain that overwrites another product's UI files. This meets the install-control-surface blocking rule even though no credential thef...

The package has a concrete automatic install-time chain that alters two foreign global agent configurations and installs instructions controlling later agent actions. This meets the insta...

This package performs unconsented install-time remote code execution through a curl-to-shell bootstrap and a second opaque package installation. That supply-chain execution path is suffic...

The automatic postinstall chain mutates broad consumer AI-agent control surfaces and package-manager safeguards. Reviewer-directed suppression of secret reporting further establishes mali...

The lifecycle hook performs persistent, cross-agent configuration changes and enables a command-executing MCP plugin without an explicit user command. This meets the install-hook abuse bl...

The package deliberately seeds an unauthenticated workspace with a fixed private HTTP OAuth authority and automatically uses it later. Although it is not install-time behavior, this is a...

Source inspection confirms credential forwarding to a fixed third-party endpoint on a reachable runtime path. The absence of install hooks does not remove the credential-exfiltration risk.

The automatic postinstall hook rewrites a foreign AI runtime in the consumer dependency tree. This is a concrete install-hook abuse even though the inspected code does not exfiltrate data.

The package combines default LLM body collection, Hub-decryptable outbound trace envelopes, and pervasive deliberate obfuscation. Although it has no install hook, the runtime data-exfiltr...

Source confirms default remote execution and transmission of the user's Zavudev API key to a separate hard-coded endpoint. There is no lifecycle hook, but the credential transfer is a con...

This is unconsented install-time mutation of a consumer project’s AI-agent control surface and package manifest. The lifecycle hook makes the behavior automatic and broad enough to requir...

The package performs unverified remote payload execution from an automatic lifecycle hook. This is a concrete install-time remote code execution path.

The concrete lifecycle chain mutates consumer package-manager settings and broad AI-agent control files, then suppresses review of those generated files. This meets the install-hook abuse...

The automatic lifecycle hook broadly mutates foreign AI-agent skill locations and executes another package’s global installer. The global-only guard does not establish consent for this cr...

The package has a concrete automatic lifecycle chain that writes and prunes skills in two unrelated agent configuration roots, then modifies the user Python environment. This meets the po...