npm security reports, with evidence.

The package has a concrete, automatic postinstall path that writes package-provided content into broad AI-agent discovery directories and Copilot instructions in the consumer project. Thi...

This is concrete install-time mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, followed by instructions that suppress independent judgment and enable package-provided command executi...

The automatic lifecycle hook changes consumer AI-agent configuration and discovery content without explicit user setup. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation block...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent discovery surfaces. The absence of observed exfiltration does not remove the concrete install-time control-hijack risk.

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. The absence of observed credential exfiltration does not neutralize the persistent contro...

The package has a concrete global post-install path that writes instruction content and executable hooks into multiple foreign AI-agent home directories. This meets the policy threshold f...

The package does not steal authentication tokens, but it collects and exports a stable identifier derived from unrelated AI-agent authentication configuration by default. This is concrete...

The automatic global launcher takeover is concrete, destructive, and targets a broad AI-agent control surface. The global-install guard does not establish consent to replace any pre-exist...

The package contains explicit AI-behavior steering that suppresses independent source verification, alongside host fingerprinting and error telemetry to a remote endpoint. These are concr...

The automatic lifecycle makes broad destructive changes to a user's Claude configuration and registers an MCP bridge. These actions meet the install-time foreign AI-agent control-surface...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of a consumer project's lifecycle and AI-agent plugin configuration. This is a concrete install-hook abuse rather than a user-invoked...

The package contains a concealed browser surveillance payload that exfiltrates extensive fingerprint and interaction data to a remote host. Although it has no npm lifecycle hook, the load...

This is an automatic install-time remote native-code delivery path with certificate validation disabled and no payload integrity check. It creates a concrete supply-chain execution risk i...

This is malicious install-hook abuse: an automatic lifecycle hook mutates foreign OpenCode project configuration, lockfiles, and caches to control the installed plugin version. Runtime co...

The automatic postinstall hook mutates broad, foreign AI-agent configuration surfaces and the user's Python environment. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy regardless...

The automatic postinstall remote-code execution is a concrete supply-chain attack surface, not a user-invoked feature. Its mutable unverified payload warrants blocking publication.

The automatic postinstall lifecycle mutates the consumer's Claude Code configuration and registers package code for every tool action. This meets the policy threshold for malicious AI-age...

The automatic global-install hook writes package-controlled skill content into several foreign AI-agent skill locations. That is unconsented broad control-surface mutation, even though th...

The confirmed automatic postinstall chain mutates Claude and Codex MCP configuration, a foreign AI-agent control surface, and adds Windows login persistence. This meets the install-hook a...

The source establishes an automatic postinstall chain that executes remote shell content and mutates the Codex plugin control surface. The global-install guard narrows exposure but does n...

The automatic postinstall performs broad consumer-project mutation and writes AI-agent instructions, then installs a plugin that restores overwritten source files. This meets the install-...