npm security reports, with evidence.

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface. The wildcard command is automatically activated for every Claude tool call, satisfying the instal...

This is an automatic postinstall mutation of a pre-existing global AI-agent command surface, rather than normal package-local bin linking. No source evidence shows network exfiltration, b...

The package has a concrete automatic install-time overwrite of a broad, potentially foreign AI-agent command surface. Its lack of network or credential behavior limits scope but does not...

The automatic lifecycle hook mutates the consumer's broad MCP agent configuration and registers an npx-delivered executable channel. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface a...

The automatic postinstall writes a foreign AI-agent configuration and configures it to run another package through npx. This is an unconsented install-time control-surface mutation and me...

The automatic postinstall path and subsequent self-repair create a concrete persistent AI-agent control-surface mutation. The global-only guard does not provide explicit user consent for...

The package has a postinstall-triggered path that mutates multiple external AI-agent configuration and plugin surfaces. This meets the policy definition of unconsented install-hook AI-age...

The automatic lifecycle hook creates persistent AI-agent instruction and hook surfaces in user homes. This meets the policy threshold for malicious install-hook abuse despite the absence...

The lifecycle-triggered global setup directly modifies multiple AI-agent home configurations and installs event-driven commands. This meets the install-hook abuse policy regardless of the...

The package has a concrete postinstall path that installs and persists package-controlled AI-agent instructions and command hooks in user home directories. This meets the policy for malic...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall path that mutates broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces and installs event-triggered commands. Its global-only guard does not establish...

The verified postinstall chain changes Claude and Codex user-level control surfaces without an explicit user setup action. That concrete install-hook behavior meets the publish-block poli...

This package has a concrete automatic postinstall path that persistently modifies user-level AI-agent configuration and hooks. The global-install guard does not provide explicit user cons...

The package contains a reachable boot path that automatically establishes persisted SSH-key access and listens on all interfaces. Although this is not an npm install hook, it is a concret...

This is a concrete automatic postinstall mutation of broad, foreign Codex and Claude agent configuration surfaces. The documented notice does not convert lifecycle execution into explicit...

The automatic lifecycle hook modifies user-wide agent configuration locations for both Codex and Claude. This meets the install-hook abuse policy even though no source-level exfiltration...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of global AI-agent control surfaces, including destructive pruning of prior content. The behavior meets the install-hook abuse blocking boundar...

The automatic lifecycle hook modifies both Codex and Claude user-level skill surfaces and prunes their contents. That concrete behavior meets the install-control-surface blocking policy e...

The postinstall hook persistently writes package-authored instructions into shared Codex and Claude directories. That concrete cross-agent control-surface mutation warrants blocking even...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, user-level AI-agent control surfaces. The lack of network activity does not remove the persistence and control-surface risk.

The automatic postinstall hook persistently injects and synchronizes package-controlled instructions in both Codex and Claude user directories. This satisfies the install-control-surface...