npm security reports, with evidence.

This is an automatic postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent configuration and instruction surfaces. The injected skill also directs autonomous agent behavior, so it meets the pub...

The lifecycle path automatically launches runtime code that defaults to installing package-controlled hooks into external Claude workspaces. This is an unconsented postinstall AI-agent co...

The automatic postinstall mutates foreign AI-agent integrations and runs remotely obtained executable code. These unconsented install-time actions meet the blocking policy.

The package explicitly exports a cloud bearer token to a fixed non-Azure service. Although it is user-command triggered and not install-time, this is concrete credential exfiltration.

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including a default Codex agent, combined with installed instructions that influence agent decisions. The gl...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. The absence of network exfiltration does not remove the persistent instruction-injection risk.

The automatic postinstall-to-Claude-hook chain is concrete, persistent, and reaches network transmission of captured AI interaction data. It meets the install-control-surface blocking pol...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, globally installed AI-agent control surface. The conditional check and opt-out do not make the automatic lifecycle mutation user-...

The automatic lifecycle hook persistently modifies multiple global AI-agent configurations and the consumer project. This meets the install-control-surface policy for a publish block.

The package performs automatic postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent configuration and starts third-party MCP tooling, including a path that forwards credentials. This meets the instal...

The automatic install-time collection and transmission of hostname and username is concrete unconsented data exfiltration. The explicit CLI configuration functionality does not mitigate t...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, with deletion and external MCP registration. The automatic global-install path is concrete in the publishe...

The source establishes automatic postinstall mutation of a consumer project, persistent lifecycle injection, project-scoped agent-plugin installation, and detached reapplication. These ar...

This is concrete unconsented install-time persistence, not merely an explicit user-requested startup option. The automatic cross-platform login registration and detached daemon launch jus...

The automatic postinstall hook persists a background package daemon across logins without an explicit user command. This is concrete install-hook persistence and warrants blocking despite...

The package performs unconsented install-time operating-system persistence and starts a detached daemon on future logins. No installer exfiltration was found, but the concrete persistence...

The package performs global AI-agent configuration writes, background execution, and persistence automatically from postinstall. This meets the install-control-surface block policy despit...

This package uses an automatic npm lifecycle hook to establish cross-platform login persistence. The behavior is concrete and does not require the user to invoke the documented startup co...

The automatic postinstall path mutates persistent AI-agent configuration and existing workspace control files. This is concrete unconsented install-time control-surface mutation, so it me...

Source directly establishes off-device transmission of an Azure bearer token to a hard-coded endpoint. The absence of an install hook limits automatic exposure but does not neutralize cre...

The package has a concrete automatic lifecycle chain that modifies a foreign global agent configuration and installs a persistent startup plugin. Source inspection found no need for remot...