npm detections from LPM Firewall.

This is a concrete postinstall chain from remote retrieval to mutation of broad project AI-agent control surfaces. The key guard limits reach but does not make the install-time mutation u...

This is a concrete, unconsented remote-controlled mutation of the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp account, not package-aligned messaging functionality. The install hook itself is benign...

The behavior is source-confirmed and install-triggered, not merely an explicit setup command. API-key and workspace prerequisites reduce reachability but do not remove the concrete broad...

The third-party credential submission is enabled by the default API-server setting and reached by the package's automatic recovery path. No install hook is needed for this runtime credent...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign project and its AI-agent configuration. Although the content is package-aligned and no exfiltration was found, the install...

Source establishes a reachable, default-enabled credential-exfiltration path with no redaction. Absence of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate runtime export of authentication secrets.

Direct source inspection confirms the scanner's critical finding. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface.

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented install-time mutation of broad/foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block boundary even though the hook does not itself...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. Lack of observed network exfiltration does not remove the in...

Source confirms the scanner finding: the lifecycle hook changes multiple user-level AI-agent skill roots rather than requiring an explicit setup command. This meets the firewall block pol...

This is concrete import-time remote payload execution, not package-aligned telemetry. The absence of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate execution during normal use.

The package contains a reachable import-time downloader/executor, not just telemetry primitives. The absence of install hooks does not mitigate execution on normal use.

Source inspection confirms an import-triggered remote binary download and execution chain in _bridge.js. No lifecycle hook is needed because index.js invokes it at runtime.

The import-time loader implements concrete, unauthenticated remote binary execution. This is malicious behavior independent of the lack of npm lifecycle hooks.

This is a concrete import-time remote code execution chain, not ordinary telemetry: remote binary bytes are executed without authentication. The absence of an npm lifecycle hook does not...

The package contains concrete, reachable remote payload execution on import. The absence of an install hook does not mitigate this runtime compromise.

This is a concrete import-time remote-code-execution chain unrelated to the minimal exported SDK. The absence of npm lifecycle hooks does not mitigate runtime execution on ordinary use.

This is a concrete import-time remote payload execution chain, not ordinary telemetry. The missing install hook does not mitigate execution when consumers import the package.

This package contains an import-time, unsigned remote binary loader and detached executor unrelated to its minimal stated client API. The concrete execution chain is sufficient for a bloc...

The package's normal import path provides an immediate, unverified download-and-execute capability. Obfuscated endpoint construction, DNS payload fallback, and detached execution establis...

This is a concrete, automatic remote-code-execution chain in the package import path. The lack of an npm lifecycle hook does not mitigate the unconsented runtime payload execution.