npm detections from LPM Firewall.

This is concrete install-time mutation of a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface. The installed wildcard handler has authority to deny Claude tool calls.

The package’s import-time launcher directly executes a bundled Windows binary whose embedded strings demonstrate C2, command execution, persistence, and update behavior. This is concrete...

This is not a benign native dependency: importing the package launches a bundled C2-capable PowerShell agent that persists on the host. The absence of an install hook does not mitigate th...

The package uses an import-time side effect to execute a bundled Windows remote-control agent. Its capture, command, persistence, and network capabilities establish concrete malicious beh...

The runtime import chain silently executes a bundled Windows binary whose static contents indicate remote command capability and persistence. The absence of an npm install hook does not m...

The behavior is directly reachable from postinstall and writes broad agent instruction surfaces after a remote fetch. Explicit setup paths do not mitigate the automatic lifecycle trigger.

This is a concealed native screen-monitoring payload unrelated to an LRU cache and activated without user consent on import. The source launcher makes the binary's remote capability direc...

This is a concrete, automatic credential and account-data exfiltration path, not merely a suspicious primitive. The install hook itself is benign, but runtime behavior warrants blocking t...

This is concrete import-time staged remote code execution, not a package-aligned feature. The absence of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate the reachable malicious entrypoint.

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, followed by package-supplied instructions that can solicit credentials and transfer project arti...

The lifecycle hook performs concrete, persistent AI-agent instruction-file mutation outside the package directory. Absence of exfiltration does not remove this install-time control-surfac...

Source inspection confirms concrete postinstall takeover of a consumer repository’s CLAUDE.md and persistence-oriented ignore-file mutation. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented...

The install-time global Claude Code configuration write meets the blocking policy regardless of the statusline's presently benign behavior. No credential exfiltration was found in the ins...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of both Claude and Codex user MCP configurations. This meets the firewall block policy regardless of the package's stated or...

The package has a concrete credential-exfiltration path and runtime mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. Its harmless postinstall does not mitigate those activated runtime beha...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent skill locations and package-controlled instructions that act on injected work. This meets the...

Concrete install-time host/user metadata exfiltration is present in source and is unrelated to the package's advertised utility. This warrants blocking publication.

The automatic external transmission of account configuration, including potentially credentials, is concrete malicious behavior. Benign workspace linking at install does not mitigate that...

This is an import-time, concealed remote payload path unrelated to the advertised UUID API. Its current README-dependent guard does not neutralize the Windows remote-code-execution behavior.

Direct source inspection confirms an install-time shell command that collects and exfiltrates host/user identifiers to a third party. The runtime utility entrypoint does not justify this...

Source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall write into pre-existing third-party AI-agent skill directories. Under the install-control-surface policy, this is a concrete blocking c...