npm detections from LPM Firewall.

Static inspection confirms install-time execution of setup and package documentation states that setup creates a supervised daemon plus agent plugins. Under the provided policy, unconsent...

Source inspection confirms concrete remote code execution from an unrelated endpoint, not merely suspicious primitives or package-aligned network activity. Although there is no install ho...

This is not package-aligned Polymarket functionality; it is a remote payload loader hidden behind icon/plugin wording and documented as normal initialization. Local source confirms arbitr...

Although the functionality is package-aligned and documented, it lifecycle-mutates a broad Claude Code control surface in the user's home config without an interactive opt-in. Under the i...

Although product-aligned and documented, the package uses an npm lifecycle hook to mutate Claude Code user settings and install an agent hook without an explicit install command. Under th...

Source inspection confirms unconsented import-time background execution and remote dynamic code execution unrelated to the advertised chai assertions. This is concrete malicious behavior,...

Static inspection confirms lifecycle-triggered MCP configuration mutation plus persistent service/global install behavior, which matches the firewall policy for unconsented AI-agent contr...

Static inspection confirms unconsented postinstall writes into a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface (.claude/skills, .claude/agents, .claude/commands), which is blockable under the in...

Static inspection confirms install-time download-and-execute behavior from a remote shell script, which is a concrete unconsented lifecycle execution surface even though the endpoint is p...

Direct source inspection confirms concrete reverse-shell behavior reachable through the package export and bundled CI check script. This is not package-aligned functionality and enables u...

Direct source inspection confirms concrete reverse-shell behavior in the package main entrypoint, with check.js showing a caller path. Lack of lifecycle execution reduces automatic trigge...

Direct source inspection confirms a reachable exported function executes a remote script through bash. This is malicious remote code execution rather than a noisy scanner-only finding.

Direct source inspection confirms import-time obfuscated remote executable download and execution with a deceptive Chrome path, unrelated to multer middleware. This is concrete malware be...

Static source inspection confirms import-time remote payload retrieval and execution concealed behind a date UUID package. This is concrete, non-package-aligned remote code execution, so...

Source inspection confirms lifecycle code writes or rewrites broad foreign AI-agent MCP/config/instruction surfaces, which matches the blockable AI-agent control hijack policy. The behavi...

The wrapper's lifecycle hook triggers persistent daemon and AI-agent plugin setup at install time, which matches the blockable unconsented agent control-surface mutation policy even thoug...

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time network exfiltration to a hardcoded Sentry DSN via package.json preinstall and examples/verify.js. This is unconsented lifecycle execution...

The package contains legitimate-looking Sentry helpers, but package installation automatically sends data to a hardcoded Sentry project and resolves/attaches the installer's public IP. Th...

The package performs unconsented install-time writes into foreign/broad AI-agent skill directories, which is blockable under the lifecycle control-surface policy even though the skill con...

Source inspection confirms unconsented install-time network telemetry to a hardcoded Sentry project plus public IP collection. Although the package exposes a plausible logging API, execut...