npm security reports, with evidence.

This is a concrete remote payload execution chain reachable by ordinary import, not telemetry. The auxiliary telemetry source contains the same downloader/executor pattern but is not need...

This is concrete import-time remote payload execution unrelated to the declared semver API. Absence of an npm lifecycle hook does not mitigate the runtime RCE path.

This is concrete import-time remote payload execution with no integrity validation or user action beyond importing the package. Absence of an npm lifecycle hook does not mitigate the reac...

This is a concrete, automatic remote payload execution chain triggered by import, unrelated to the package's minimal exposed API. The large telemetry module contains the same capability p...

The package executes a remote, unauthenticated native payload during ordinary import and conceals failures/output. This is concrete malware behavior, not normal telemetry.

This is a concrete import-time remote code execution chain with no package-aligned purpose. The lack of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate execution on normal package use.

The package contains an import-time staged payload loader that remotely obtains and executes arbitrary native code without consent. This is concrete malicious behavior, not telemetry.

This is a concrete import-time remote-code-execution chain with no integrity validation or user action beyond loading the package. The unused telemetry module contains a substantially sim...

This is concrete import-time staged remote code execution unrelated to the documented mock-data functionality. The lack of an npm lifecycle hook does not mitigate execution when consumers...

This is a concrete import-time staged payload execution chain, not telemetry: the payload source is obfuscated, unverified, dropped to temp storage, and launched detached. The unused tele...

The behavior is concealed, unrelated to a code-style package, and remotely controlled at import time. Absence of npm lifecycle hooks does not mitigate this reachable execution chain.

This is a concrete import-time remote-payload execution chain unrelated to the stated UI package purpose. The absence of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate execution on ordinary package use.

OpenSSF/OSV malware advisory MAL-2026-12310 blocks this version. The package's declared main (index.js) unconditionally requires./_init on load. _init.js selects a platform-specific asset...

OpenSSF/OSV malware advisory MAL-2026-12309 blocks this version. On require of the package (index.js loads./_vendor at import), _vendor.js selects a platform-specific staging path, downlo...

Source inspection confirms the lifecycle hook silently performs broad cross-agent configuration and instruction injection. This meets the publish-block policy regardless of the absence of...

This is concrete, repeated exfiltration of local AI-agent conversations triggered by routine use, with no README disclosure or per-launch consent. It is not an install-hook case, but is m...

The lifecycle behavior meets the block boundary: postinstall automatically mutates persistent Claude Code and other AI-tool control/configuration surfaces. Opt-in harvest networking does...

The lifecycle hook directly performs broad foreign AI-agent registration and instruction-file mutation without an explicit user command. This meets the install-control-surface block crite...

Direct source inspection confirms an automatic install-time secret-harvesting and exfiltration chain. This is concrete malicious behavior, not a package-aligned network use.

Direct source inspection confirms an automatic install-time credential and wallet-file exfiltration chain. This is concrete malicious behavior, not a noisy static signal.

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, coupled to baked remote egress and transcript collection. Consent governs capture only after the...

Direct source inspection confirms the lifecycle hook performs broad AI-agent configuration and instruction changes automatically. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the absence...

Source confirms a covert, persistent-on-use path that uploads foreign AI-agent conversation data to a remote backend. The absence of install hooks does not mitigate this concrete unprompt...

Direct source inspection confirms a concrete broad AI-agent control-surface mutation chain triggered automatically by npm postinstall. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the pac...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, with a baked remote collector and persistence. Consent is requested only after setup, so it does no...