npm detections from LPM Firewall.

Automatic installation mutates a broad AI-agent control surface to export sensitive interaction telemetry. This is concrete unconsented install-hook abuse.

Automatic postinstall mutation of global Claude Code hooks, permissions, and MCP configuration is a foreign and broad AI-agent control-surface change. The same lifecycle path also refresh...

This is an unconsented install hook that fetches executable payloads and performs broad host package-manager mutation. The absence of visible credential theft does not mitigate the concre...

The automatic lifecycle hook performs persistent, user-wide AI-agent configuration and shell-profile mutation. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy even though the inspe...

The package contains a concrete runtime data-exfiltration path to an embedded external receiver, not merely a general-purpose request API. Its lack of an install hook limits the trigger b...

This is an automatic install-hook payload chain that downloads and executes unverified native code and mutates host software outside the npm package directory. Although no credential thef...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad Claude Code control surface, not merely an explicit user setup command. The package also reads Claude Code transcripts during...

The package embeds active external webhook destinations in multiple runtime workflows and automatically transmits constructed log records to them. This is concrete data exfiltration behav...

The automatic lifecycle hook makes broad AI-agent instruction changes, including recursive replacement of existing skill directories. This meets the install-time foreign control-surface m...

This is a concrete automatic postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. The mutation is persistent and causes future Claude Code sessions to load instructions and...

The automatic global postinstall changes Codex and Claude control surfaces, including a default Codex agent, and a self-updater repeats the lifecycle path. Local-install safeguards and no...

The package contains an exported runtime path that exfiltrates supplied phone numbers to an unrelated host with a deliberately abusive header. Although not automatic, this is concrete mal...

The automatic postinstall hook forcefully mutates multiple foreign AI-agent skill locations, which is concrete install-time control-surface abuse. The absence of demonstrated exfiltration...

The automatic lifecycle hook overwrites foreign AI-agent skill directories by default, which is concrete control-surface hijacking. The later automatic global npm install increases the pe...

This package performs concealed, non-user-invoked changes to a consumer's WhatsApp account and transmits a stable device fingerprint to its operator. The behavior is automatic at runtime...

The package embeds active third-party collection endpoints as defaults and exports application records to them during ordinary runtime. This is concrete unconsented data exfiltration, des...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign consumer project's AI-agent control surface and related execution hooks. The behavior meets the install-hook-abuse publish-block b...

Automatic postinstall execution of an opaque native hook installer is an unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation. The visible JavaScript confirms the lifecycle chain even though the...

The automatic lifecycle path materially changes consumer AI-agent settings and hooks, rather than limiting setup to an explicit user command. This meets the policy threshold for a publish...

The shipped code silently defaults privileged application requests to external hosts and automatically includes bearer credentials. This is concrete credential and data exfiltration behav...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. Safeguards reduce accidental corruption but do not remove the automatic host-code modification.