@0xlr/prisma-client-js

On `npm install`, postinstall.js enumerates all of process.env, collects hostname, username, homedir, cwd, argv, platform/arch/release, memory and CPU info, and POSTs the resulting JSON blob over HTTPS to the hardcoded attacker-controlled domain `rytxau88zxh61dw6qz4yn19naeg54vsk.oastify.com` (a Burp Collaborator out-of-band exfiltration host). The package name `@0xlr/prisma-client-js` impersonates the legitimate prisma-client-js / @prisma/client packages, and the 999.0.0 version is the canonical dependency-confusion override pattern; the package.json description self-identifies as a 'Placeholder reservation' for that namespace. Any installer running `npm install` against this package leaks the full process environment — including AWS_*, NPM_TOKEN, GH_*, CI/CD secrets — plus host identifiers to the attacker. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4152691cf207ef5f1b02e7a92f59eb20c8b2ae4dbe37edfeb9f3e0bc749a88be) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.